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The European Commission is currently evalu-
ating the functioning of the 2003 reform of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a process
known as the ‘health check’. Due to the analytical
complexity of the policy evaluation and the need
for both theoretical analysis and solid empirical
work, the contribution of the research community
to the policy debate are seen as essential (see Bas-
cou and Münch in this report).
As part of the long-term co-operation between
the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural
Development and the Joint Research Centre, the
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies or-
ganised an expert workshop in June 2007 entitled
“Income and Factor Markets under the 2003 CAP
Reform”. The aim of the workshop was to provide
a framework in which members of the academia
could report and discuss the latest research find-
ings relating to the ‘health check’ and in which
policymakers could point out their needs for fur-
ther research, particularly linked with the function-
ing of the current CAP. The workshop was
organised around two broad topics: (a) the 2003
CAP reform (Pillar 1) effect on the income distri-
bution among farm types (in terms of size and pro-
duction orientation) and regions, and (b) the effect
of decoupling direct payments on agricultural fac-
tor markets. This publication is a collection of short
papers provided by the speakers as a background
to their oral presentations. 
Most of the research indicated that there were
important variations of the 2003 CAP reform im-
pact on farm income, depending on the imple-
mentation scheme of direct payments (e.g.
following historical or regional references) and the
degree of the decoupling applied (full or partial).
Implementation of the single payment scheme, fol-
lowing the historical model, maintains the distri-
bution of the first pillar budget fund among farmers
unchanged, owing to the influence of previously
received higher support in the reference period.
The move from partial to full decoupling of direct
payments brings positive income effects, removing
the distortions to competition in some sectors (e.g.
beef sector within the EU). An overview of the re-
sults reported in several modelling exercises (e.g.
CAPRI, AROPAj, FARMIS) suggests an overall pos-
itive income effect of implementing the 2003 CAP
reform. Factors such as model specification, aggre-
gation level, and target year and/or scenario as-
sumption influence the absolute values reported
by each modelling approach. 
The workshop also offered grounds for pre-
senting and discussing the decoupled policy sup-
port effects on land markets. Particularly, the
possible capitalisation of the single payment into
land prices and the land rent price increases
came into the forefront of the policy debate.
These could have an effect on the wealth distribu-
tion, adjustment capacity of the sector, and entry
into and exit from the sector. Studies discussed in
the workshop generally confirmed the land price
effect of the SPS and pointed out differences de-
pending, for example, on the SPS implementation
chosen, on land market institutions, or linkages
between the agricultural and other sectors all
varying among MSs. Analyses presented based on
simulation models showed that in countries
where land markets are not constrained by regu-
lations or institutions, the SPS leads to increasing
rental land prices, especially for grassland, and
therefore income transmission in favour of own-
ers. The effect of the ‘regional’ SPS was shown
larger than the effect of implementing the ‘histor-
ical’ SPS. The SPS activation constraint1 linking
the payment entitlements to land use was consid-
ered to be the main reason for the land/land rent
prices effect of the single payment scheme.
Higher land rent prices for operating farmers de-
crease the wealth effect of the reform and in-
crease the net effect of off-farm labour. However,
empirical studies illustrated that even in countries
where the implementation of the SPS is more
likely to stimulate structural changes and farmers
are planning to exit earlier than they would have
done under Agenda 2000, very little land is likely
Executive Summary
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1 To receive the payment, the farmer is obliged to maintain land in agricultural use while the number of hectares has to be at least equal
to the number of entitlements she/he holds.
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to be abandoned as the demand for land for farm
growth persists after the policy change.
Few empirical evidence exist to date regard-
ing the 2003 CAP reform effects on the labour mar-
ket, particularly on pluri-active farms and waged
labour. Given that the reform is a combination of
income payment and price decrease, theoretical
expectations regarding these aspects depend,
among others, on the relationship between leisure
and farm work, and the separability of production
and labour allocation decisions (e.g. in case of
farmers engaged in off-farm work, if the two deci-
sions are separable — and farm prices do not
change — the introduction of decoupled payments
will decrease their off-farm work). The overall ef-
fect of the CAP reform on waged labour is difficult
to grasp as it depends on whether the decrease in
total farm work (depending on the substitution ef-
fect between family and waged labour) is larger or
smaller than the decrease in the farmer’s on-farm
work (depending on wealth effects of the reform).
Owing to the modest empirical estimates reported
so far, dramatic effects of the 2003 CAP reform on
wage labour use and pluri–active farms are not to
be expected. However, in the absence of clear-cut
theoretical expectations, the analysis of the effects
of the reform on the labour market would greatly
benefit from additional empirical evidences.
The last topic covered during the workshop
concerned the 2003 CAP reform effect on farm in-
vestment. The results of the studies presented im-
plied that the ex-ante analysis of the reform effect
on farm investment is a highly challenging task.
Previous CAP reforms did not show as having a sig-
nificant impact on aggregate investments. The
same effect was expected for the 2003 CAP re-
form; nevertheless, farm-level investment differ-
ences and regional effects on farm investment
were suggested as possibly occurring. Decoupled
payments and a reduction of intervention prices
were discussed to likely call for adjustments in the
structure of farm production capacity, and thus for
a change in the investment use of additional funds.
However, these adjustments were only expected
to take place slowly, as changes in production
structures are linked to high sunk costs resulting
from high agricultural assets specificity. At the
same time, discussion results suggested that non-
specific farm investments (i.e. in land) or off-farm
investments will become more attractive. Further-
more, changes in intervention prices are expected
to introduce price volatility reducing investment
incentives, while some Pillar 2 measures, such as
interest rate reduction or subsidies to specific in-
vestments, can be expected to have a positive ef-
fect on on-farm investments. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies suggested that
reactions to the policy changes significantly vary
among farms. This is based on results from surveys
conducted in Italy, Germany, Poland, Spain,
Greece, the Netherlands, France, and Hungary.
Results indicated that operators of more efficient
and expansion-oriented farms perceived decou-
pling as an opportunity for investment, while
small, poorer performing farms viewed the intro-
duction of the single farm payment scheme rather
as an aid allowing production extensification.
Based on evidence from the Czech Republic, in-
vestment behaviour significantly varied with farm
characteristics such as farm ownership. Therefore,
it was suggested that in new Member States with
high ownership structure heterogeneity, the signif-
icant inflow of policy transfers after EU accession
will have marked consequences for farm structural
development.
Empirical studies of selected EU countries and
regions that were brought to the attention in the
workshop highlighted a marked heterogeneity of
local conditions influencing the policy reform im-
pacts. This marked heterogeneity called for cau-
tion when using the empirical results for drawing
EU-wide level conclusions. Also results from ex-
ante policy impact analyses suggested careful in-
terpretation of quantified changes as presentations
revealed a notable degree of variability in results
among model specifications and/or levels of ag-
gregation. Workshop participants identified a high
need of (i) additional empirical work to contribute
to the understanding of national/regional contexts
and allow the build up of longer time series of ob-
servations, (ii) refinement of theoretical models,
and (iii) extensions of analytical modelling tools to
facilitate analyses of medium- and long-term ef-
fects of the CAP reforms on income, factor markets
as well as other aspects of agriculture and develop-
ment of EU rural areas.
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The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) em-
barked on a wave of reform that started in 1992.
This reform process was then strengthened in 1999
with the Agenda 2000 and deepened in 2003 with
the start of a new process of fundamental reform.
This reform process, which is now almost com-
plete with the latest reform of the banana and fruit
and vegetables common market organisations,
aims at promoting the European Model of Agricul-
ture, i.e. an agricultural sector which is competi-
tive, sustainable, market-oriented, harmoniously
integrated in rural areas and which meets society’s
concerns. The most important element of the re-
form is the introduction of the single payment
scheme (SPS) and the decoupling of the vast ma-
jority of direct payments.
The medium-term policy framework can be
expected to be shaped by the “health check”, i.e.
a review of the implementation of the CAP reform
in order to ensure that the CAP is working as it
should and by the “review clause” of all aspects of
EU spending, including the CAP, that is likely to
address more long-term issues.
The “health check” includes a set of report-
ing obligations and review clauses over the 2006-
2010 period (with a view to evaluate, correct,
adapt and simplify where appropriate). They con-
cern market measures (such as dried fodder,
dairy, cotton, energy crops) as well as cross-com-
pliance and farm advisory systems. The “health
check” should also cover a review of the imple-
mentation of the SPS (degree of decoupling, de-
coupling model etc.), of policy instruments for
market support as well as issues related to risk
management. Finally, financial issues such as
capping, modulation and degressivity could also
be raised.
In this context, many policy issues will have to
be addressed, including:
• The competitiveness of the farm sector (in
relation to market and trade developments;
farm income and profitability);
• Structural adjustment (capitalisation of sup-
port in the prices of production factors;
value of agricultural assets; the role of rural
development policy in facilitating structural
changes);
• Transfer efficiency of farm support;
• Provision of public goods.
An examination of income developments and
distribution over the last 25 years shows that the
income gap between the agricultural and the non-
farm sectors remains. Whether assessed in terms
of disposable household income or of income gen-
eration, the farm sector clearly underperforms the
other economic/household sectors. The income
gap has further deteriorated with the recent suc-
cessive enlargements. In this context, the contri-
bution of direct payments to income as well as
their distribution across producers should be re-
viewed.
As far as the income and labour markets are
concerned, many policy issues need to be ad-
dressed, including:
• Farm household income (in terms of diver-
sification and household behaviour);
• Income transfer efficiency;
• Targeting vs. equity issue;
• Functioning of the labour markets (which
may condition policy adjustment of the sec-
tor).
With the introduction of the SPS, the func-
tioning and efficiency of land markets have come
at the forefront of the policy debate. Besides its
economic importance and the imperfections of
its markets, land as a production factor consti-
Income and Factor Markets under the 2003 CAP Reform –
The Policy Context
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* European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (EC DG AGRI), Rue de la Loi 130, 4th floor, B-1049
Brussels, Belgium. E-mails: Pierre.Bascou@ec.europa.eu and Wolfgang.Munch@ec.europa.eu.
PIERRE BASCOU* AND WOLFGANG MÜNCH*
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tutes a key factor in determining the relative com-
petitiveness (within agriculture and outside the
farm sector and the EU) of the agricultural sector
in relation with the institutional (legal and socio-
economic) framework. However, land constitutes
not only a production factor but also collateral
for access to capital and an insurance/wealth fac-
tor for producers.
The impact of the CAP reform process (no-
tably the SPS) on the land markets represents a crit-
ical policy issue and may significantly influence
the degree of policy (income) efficiency. The cur-
rent systems of implementation of the SPS in the
various regions of the EU (in particular their link
to land, the presence of “naked land” and the de-
gree of decoupling) should entail differing degree
of capitalisation of support in the cost of land.
Land price formation is a complex issue
owing to the regional diversity, the link with other
economic sectors and the role of public support
(and the various systems of SPS). Furthermore, it
strongly depends on national/regional legal
frameworks (contrary to output markets) and
socio-economic conditions (with highly diverg-
ing perspectives for EU regions).
Developments on land markets should have a
critical influence on the adjustment capacity of the
sector and the entry into and exit from the sector.
Depending on the regions, land prices would con-
dition the adjustment capacity of producers to
adapt to changing economic environment.
Addressing the numerous policy issues related
to the study of the impact of the CAP reform
process on the land and labour markets represents
significant analytical challenges. Beyond theoreti-
cal examination, it requires solid empirical work.
In this framework, the contribution of the research
community to the policy debate will be essential.
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Agricultural Incomes in the EU and Public Policies
VINCENT CHATELLIER*, HERVÉ GUYOMARD†, LAURE LATRUFFE†, AND FABRICE LEVERT†
Introduction
The paper first discusses the issue of measur-
ing agricultural incomes (section 1). It then de-
scribes the evolution of EU agricultural income
support policies since 1992 and raises the issue of
capitalisation of income support in farm assets, no-
tably land value (section 2). The French case is used
to illustrate how incomes from agricultural activity
vary in function of output choice and farm size (sec-
tion 3). This example also shows the increasing de-
pendence of farm incomes on direct aids. Hence,
the last section analyses the income effects of vari-
ous scenarios involving the level and the allocation
rules of first and second pillar direct aids.
Measuring incomes in agriculture - in-
come from agricultural activity versus
overall income of agricultural house-
holds 
Traditional indicators of agricultural incomes
adopt a producer point of view. As they relate solely
to the income generated by agricultural activity,
they do not include incomes from other sources
(non-agricultural activities, salaries, social benefits
and income from property). The standard indicator
(IA) is the net value added at factor cost.1 Data in
real terms are obtained by deflating nominal values
by the implicit price index of Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) at market prices. Real agricultural in-
comes per worker are then defined by dividing real
farm incomes by agricultural labour measured in
Annual Working Units (AWUs) to take account of
part-time farming and seasonal work (one AWU
corresponds to the input of one person engaged in
agricultural activity in an agricultural unit on a full-
time basis over an entire year). This first indicator IA
measures the remuneration of primary inputs, i.e.,
capital, land and labour (plus production rights). By
subtracting from IA the compensation of employ-
ees, one defines the net operating surplus which
measures the yield from capital, land and unpaid
labour (indicator IB). By subtracting from the net op-
erating surplus interest payments, land rents and
farm rents, one defines the net entrepreneurial in-
come which remunerates unpaid labour as well as
capital and land belonging to production units (in-
dicator IC). From these three definitions, one imme-
diately sees that many factors determine the level
and the development of agricultural activity in-
comes: production levels and prices, input quanti-
ties and costs, subsidies and taxes, etc. These factors
are not independent. They are themselves influ-
enced by exogenous parameters (climatic condi-
tions), market conditions (notably the balance
between supply and demand) and policy changes. 
Income from agricultural activity does not
measure overall income of agricultural households
which also includes incomes generated by non-
agricultural activities of household members. Meas-
uring overall income of agricultural households
raises two practical problems. First, Farm Account-
ancy Data Network (FADN) databases do not pro-
vide information on incomes from non-agricultural
activities. In some countries, this first problem is (at
least partially) addressed by developing specific sur-
veys and methods for collecting information on in-
comes from non-agricultural sources. However,
information registered through this way differs from
one country to another making inter-country com-
parison difficult. In France three matching exercises
* Institut National de Recherches Agronomiques (INRA), Department of Social Sciences (SAE2), Rue la Géraudière, BP 71627, 44300
Nantes, France. E-mail: vchatel@nantes.inra.fr.
† Institut National de Recherches Agronomiques (INRA), Department of Social Sciences (SAE2), Rue St Brieuc 65, 35000 Rennes, France.
E-mails: Herve.Guyomard@rennes.inra.fr, Laure.Latruffe@rennes.inra.fr, and Fabrice.Levert@rennes.inra.fr.
1 The net value at factor cost is defined by subtracting from the value of agricultural output at basic prices (prices received by producers
net of subsidies and taxes on products) plus other subsidies on production (product specific and non-product specific subsidies), the
value of intermediate consumption, the consumption of fixed capital and other taxes on production.
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were performed in 1991, 1997 and 2003 using the
tax revenue register and the FADN database to com-
pare incomes from agricultural activity and overall
incomes of agricultural households. By construc-
tion, the comparison is restricted to professional
farms, that is, farms with more than 0.75 AWUs
and/or a Standard Gross Margin (SGM) greater than
8 Economic Size Units (ESUs). In 2003 incomes
from non-agricultural sources accounted for 40 %
of overall incomes of French professional agricul-
tural households. The corresponding percentage
was 25 % in 1997. However, for 51 % of French
professional agricultural households, incomes from
non-agricultural sources were equal to zero in
2003. On average, part-time agricultural house-
holds were largely better off than full-time units in
terms of both SGM and income.
EU farm income support policy: some
questions raised by the Single Payment
Scheme
Income support is still an essential objective
of the CAP. It is now well admitted that market
price support policies are inappropriate devices for
supporting farm incomes in so far as there exist
other instruments that are simultaneously more ef-
ficient and less trade distorting. In that perspective,
one achievement of the CAP reform process is
clearly to increase the transfer efficiency in favour
of agricultural producers through the continuous
shift from market price support to direct aids pro-
gressively more and more decoupled from produc-
tion and factor use. But efficiency and equity are
two different concepts. One drawback of the June
2003 CAP reform is that it does not address the
question of the uneven distribution of agricultural
aids across countries, regions and farmers. The
CAP as it now applies still benefits proportionally
more to North-European countries and larger
farms. There are distributional issues not only
within the agricultural sphere but also with other
economic sectors. On this point, critics are clearly
summarised in the so-called Sapir Report (Sapir et
al., 2003). According to this report, the CAP has
moved from an allocative policy enhancing com-
petitiveness towards a distributive policy targeted
on a particular group of citizens. The report con-
siders this as a “systemic anomaly” and recom-
mends addressing this issue at Member State level.
Some agricultural economists argue that the
2003 CAP reform does not go far enough to capture
all the benefits of decoupling. Of primary concern
is the potential capitalisation of the Single Farm Pay-
ment (SFP) into land prices. Of course, production
is no longer required to get the payment attached
to entitlements.2 But the scheme maintains a very
specific link between payments and land use
through the so-called activation constraint, i.e., the
obligation for the farmer to maintain in agricultural
use a number of hectares at least equal to the num-
ber of entitlements she (he) holds to get the payment
attached to the latter. This constraint is likely to
maintain the capitalisation of support into farm land
prices, in favour of landowners and to the detriment
of farmers. The greater the number of entitlements
relative to the number of admissible hectares, the
higher the capitalisation of the SFP into farm land
prices (Guyomard et al., 2007).3
Incomes from agricultural activity in
France
At the national level, real farm incomes per
worker exhibit a contrasted pattern of evolution
over the last 15 years that is a continuous increase
from 1994 to 1998 followed by a continuous de-
crease from 1999 to 2005. Real incomes per
worker increased over the 1994-1998 period de-
spite the 1992 CAP reform which reduced institu-
tional prices for cereals and beef meat. However,
these price cuts were fully compensated by direct
aids and labour productivity gains were rather high
over the years 1994 to 1998. By contrast, price cut
compensation was only partial following the
Agenda 2000 CAP reform of 1999 and labour pro-
ductivity gains were much lower over the years
1999 to 2005 (Butault, 2006). This contrasted evo-
lution has brought the indicator IA to a level of
around 17,000 Euros in 2005 that is a level only
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2 The SFP is broken down into a certain number of entitlements which in practice correspond to unit amounts of direct aids per hectare in
so far as each entitlement has to be accompanied by an eligible hectare in order to give right to the payment of the amount fixed by the
payment entitlement.
3 The lower the supply price elasticity of land and the fewer substitution possibilities between inputs, the higher the capitalisation of sup-
port into farm land prices, ceteris paribus (Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2006).
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slightly greater than the 1993 level. Figures for
2006 suggest a significant increase in real incomes
per worker, essentially thanks to positive output
price effects. 
In “2005” (average of the years 2001 to 2005),
real agricultural incomes per family worker of
French professional farms were equal to 20,200
Euros.4 This average figure masks substantial dispar-
ities among units classified according to their prod-
uct choice and their economic dimension. On
average, farms of the highest economic dimension
(more than 100 ESUs) had an income per family
worker three times higher than farms of the lowest
economic dimension (less than 30 ESUs), respec-
tively 32,400 and 11,700 Euros. The ratio of in-
comes on the value of production plus direct aids
was equal to 20 %. The higher the economic di-
mension, the lower the ratio of incomes on the
value of production plus direct aids (from 25 % for
the farms of the lowest economic dimension to
18 % for the farms of the highest economic dimen-
sion). On average, direct aids represented 87 % of
incomes. The dependence of incomes on direct aids
was largely greater than 100 % for beef farms
(148 %), sheep and goat farms (140 %), as well as
for producers of cereals and oilseeds (127 %). It was
equal to 87 % for dairy farms. It was very low for
farms specialised in pork and poultry (29 %), horti-
culture and permanent crops (24 %), as well as
wine production (8 %). The dependence of incomes
upon direct aids will very likely increase in the next
years, ceteris paribus, because of an increasing
number of products included in the CAP reform
process (olive oil, tobacco, sugar, fruits and vegeta-
bles, wine). Interestingly, the ratio of direct aids on
incomes is equally important for all classes of eco-
nomic dimension.
Impacts of domestic support reforms
on agricultural activity incomes in
France
The baseline: impacts of the Single Payment
Scheme on French agricultural incomes
The 2003 Single Payment Scheme (SPS) miti-
gates into a SFP most of per-hectare and per-head
direct aids. France chose to implement the SPS
using the historical model which, by construction,
maintains unchanged the distribution of first pillar
budget funds among farms, ceteris paribus. France
maintained coupled 25 % of direct aids for arable
crops, 100 % of sucker cow premiums, 100 % of
calf slaughter premiums, 40 % of adult cattle
slaughter premiums and 50 % of sheep and goat
premiums. France has thus fully exploited the pos-
sibility offered by the European legislation of main-
taining coupled some of direct aids that were
formerly granted on a per-hectare or per-head
basis. The baseline situation includes the dairy and
sugar reforms. It assumes that 70 % of land under
mandatory set aside is used for production of bio-
fuels and it incorporates a 5 % mandatory modu-
lation rate. Prices and quantities are assumed
unchanged at “2005” levels.
Under these baseline assumptions (H1), the
single payment (57 % of total direct aids) amounts
to 16,500 Euros per farm and 234 Euros per
hectare. Single payment amounts per farm and per
hectare vary considerably according to farm ori-
entation. For example, the single payment per farm
is three times higher for a wheat grower
(29,500 Euros) than for a specialised beef producer
(11,500 Euros). By definition of the historical
model, the single payment per farm is higher for
units previously oriented towards highly supported
productions (arable crops, milk and beef). It is
lower for beef farms (14,900 Euros per farm) than
for dairy farms (23,000 Euros per farm) or farms
specialised in arable crops (26,200 Euros per farm)
because of a higher degree of re-coupling in beef
relative to milk and arable crops. The higher the
size of the farm (expressed in hectares) the higher
the single payment per farm, ceteris paribus. The
ratio of the SFP on total direct aids varies signifi-
cantly in function of farm orientation/specialisa-
tion. This ratio is lower for extensive dairy, beef and
sheep farms because these units are also supported
through second pillar measures which are not in-
cluded in the SFP. This is the case in particular for
extensive dairy, beef and sheep farms in mountain-
ous areas. The single payment per hectare (on av-
erage 234 Euros) varies from 125 Euros (sheep and
goat farms) to 349 Euros (specialised dairy farms
with a surface in fodder maize greater than 30 %
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In
co
m
e 
an
d 
Fa
ct
or
 M
ar
ke
ts
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
20
03
 C
A
P 
R
ef
or
m
 –
 W
or
ks
ho
p 
Pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s
12
of total forage area). It is significantly lower for beef
farms (167 Euros) than for dairy farms (270 Euros)
and farms specialised in arable crops (290 Euros).
Scenario S1: impacts of total decoupling 
Under the assumption of total decoupling
(scenario S1), the single payment (80 % of total di-
rect aids) amounts to 23,100 Euros per farm and
327 Euros per hectare (an increase by 40 % rela-
tive to the assumption of partial re-coupling). The
increase per farm and/or per hectare is logically
more marked for beef farms (the single payment
per beef farm increases from 14,900 Euros in the
baseline to 28,600 Euros in this scenario S1, that is
a rise of 92 %) than for dairy farms (the single pay-
ment per dairy farms increases from 23,000 under
H1 to 27,800 Euros under S1, that is a rise of
21 %). The single payment per farm and per
hectare of arable crop producers increases by
about 25 % due to the inclusion into the SFP of the
25 % of direct aids that were previously main-
tained coupled. Even under the assumption of total
decoupling, considerable differences remain in
amounts of decoupled aids per farm and/or per
hectare. The single payment per hectare is equal
to 177 Euros for specialised dairy farms with a fod-
der maize surface lower than 10 % of total forage
area, but to 415 Euros for specialised dairy farms
with a fodder maize surface greater than 30 % of
total forage area. On average, the single payment
per hectare is equal to 321 Euros for beef farms,
327 Euros for dairy farms and 368 Euros for arable
crop farms.
Scenario S2: impacts of a 20 % manda-
tory modulation
The second scenario S2 assumes a mandatory
modulation of all first pillar direct aids at a rate of
20 %, all the funds saved through this mechanism
being reallocated on existing measures of the sec-
ond pillar.5 By construction of the scenario, its im-
pact on the average income of French professional
farms is null. However, some types of farms loose
while other types gain. Units which suffer the most
are those which, under H1, received large
amounts of first pillar direct aids and small
amounts of second pillar subsidies. This is the case,
for example, of arable crop producers who record
an income loss of 19 % and intensive dairy farm-
ers who suffer from an income decrease of 14 %.
By contrast, extensive livestock farms, notably
those located in mountain areas, register signifi-
cant gains: incomes increase by 48 % for sheep
and goat farms, 45 % for grass-based dairy farms
and 25 % for specialised beef farms. This modula-
tion scenario would favour smaller size units rela-
tive to large size units. In other words, the
distribution of direct aids would be slightly less un-
equal in this scenario S1 relative to the baseline
H1.
Regarding output price changes that would be
needed to neutralise the positive or negative effect
on incomes of this 20 % modulation scenario, one
notes first that a very small increase (1 %) would
be sufficient so that incomes of dairy farms are the
same in the baseline H1 and in this scenario S1. In
the same way, a relatively small increase (5 %) in
prices of cereals and oilseeds would be sufficient
to neutralise the negative impact on incomes of
arable crop producers of this 20 % modulation
scenario. These average figures mask significant
disparities among farms according to their product
choice and/or economic dimension. The case of
dairy farms illustrates this diversity. Farm-gate milk
prices should increase by 3 % to maintain un-
changed incomes of fodder maize based dairy
farms but they should decrease by 14 % to main-
tain unchanged incomes of grass-based dairy
farms.
Scenario S3: impacts of a 35 % cut in
First Pillar direct aids
The third scenario S3 assumes full decou-
pling. The SPS is applied using the regionalised
model. Unit values of entitlements are thus identi-
cal for two farmers located in the same region.
These unit values are cut by 35 %. But contrary to
S2, funds saved thanks to this mechanism are not
used to increase second pillar subsidies. 
On average, incomes of French professional
farms decrease by 28 % (8,100 Euros) because of
the decrease by 35 % in first pillar decoupled di-
rect aids. Income losses are particularly important
for arable crop growers (-50 %) and beef produc-
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ers (-45 %). Dairy farms also suffer from a substan-
tial income decrease (-32 %) with important dif-
ferences according to farm characteristics. While
fodder maize based large units record an income
loss of 42 %, grass-based small to medium units
obtain an income gain. However, output price
changes needed to neutralize these huge income
losses would be rather “modest”. Farm-gate milk
prices should increase by 7 %, beef prices by 14 %
and arable crop prices by 11 %.
Concluding comments
Given the weight of direct aids in agricultural
incomes, any reduction in first pillar direct aids
and/or any redistribution of funds from the first to
the second pillar will significantly impact most
types of farms. Accordingly, it would be econom-
ically (and politically) dangerous to implement too
drastic and rapid cuts in first pillar direct aids. In
other words, cuts should be spread over several
years to allow farmers to adapt. The dependence of
farm incomes on direct aids also highlights the risk
of a domestic support reform strategy excessively
based on a mechanism of “communicating ves-
sels” (cuts in first pillar aids to increase budget sup-
port of the second pillar). Clearly, a better strategy
would be: first to define policy objectives, be they
of the first or second pillar; second to define effi-
cient instruments and resources needed to achieve
these objectives. In that respect, it is clear that the
2003 CAP reform does not address the question of
small and poor farmers, very often located in mar-
ginal zones where agriculture is still a major eco-
nomic activity and employment alternatives are
seldom. In the same way, it does not address the
question of agricultural price and income instabil-
ity. Income support expenditure could and should
be significantly reduced and funds saved by this
way used to finance price and income stabilisation
programmes as well as remunerate positive envi-
ronmental and territorial public goods.
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Income Effects of 2003 CAP Reform – Review of Modelling
Approaches and Recommendations 
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Introduction 
Income effects of policy changes play an im-
portant role in the decision-making process. Mar-
ket and income effects were at the centre of studies
regarding the 2003 Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) reform, especially dealing with decoupling
of direct payments and its implementation in the
Member States (MS). I will give an overview on
modelling approaches and predicted income ef-
fects and give some recommendations on proba-
ble income effects of policy changes discussed
with regard to the “health check”.
Modelling approaches 
Quantitative models can contribute to ex-ante
analysis of policy changes. Furthermore they are
suitable to quantify the partial effects of single po-
litical measures or the combined effects with oth-
ers. On this basis, valuable information can be
drawn with regard to the impacts of single meas-
ures or an optimal policy mix. 
Considerable efforts were realised in the de-
velopment and application of mathematical pro-
gramming models for policy analysis. EU-wide
models and models specified for some Member
Sates are used for the analysis of CAP reform. They
differ in the model type (LP/MIP; NLP/PMP),
process differentiation, periodicity, model calibra-
tion, income indicators and data base (EU- or na-
tional FADN). Scenario analysis is done with
regard to base or target years. In most farm (group)
models, price changes are handled exogenously
based on market models. The integration of a sup-
ply and market model in CAPRI allows simultane-
ous optimisations to reach market equilibrium. 
Exemplarily for the construction and working
steps of mathematical programming models, a
brief overview is given with regard to the farm
group model FARMIS. Formerly developed for the
German agricultural sector, the model has been
extended to other EU MS. The model work pro-
ceeds in the following steps: 
• Selection of farm groups on the basis of in-
dividual farms, constant samples, multi-year
averages, flexible selection of farm groups
depending on location, type, size, etc.
• Application of an improved aggregation
scheme allowing consistent sectoral aggre-
gation with regard to standard income, land
use and livestock. 
• Generation of activity specific I/O coeffi-
cients: support points for entropy estimation
based on management handbooks or expert
knowledge. Complex balancing of feed use
by means of entropy method. 
• Model generation and model calibration:
Calibration related to base year by means of
PMP allowing exact base year projection.
However, supply reaction is influenced by
standardisation of the revenue function by
means of elasticities. Problems exist prima-
rily with regard to the implementation of
normative components, i.e., new activities
(mulching, biomass, different intensities). 
• Scenario analysis with regard to target years
(2013, ... 2015), related to the underlying
full cost approach, as well as the final step
of policy measures (Regional Model) after
stepwise implementation. 
• Optimisation of each farm group, aggrega-
tion of the results using weighting factors.
Recursive or simultaneous optimisation
over all farm groups in defined regions with
regard to assessments of rental land market,
milk quota trade and structural change. 
• Income indicators: Farm Net Value Added
(FNVA) serves for the remuneration of fixed
factors of production, whether external or
family owned, being calculated on the basis
of output and input levels and prices. The
* Federal Agricultural Research Centre (FAL), Bundesallee 50, 38116 Braunschweig, Germany. E-mail: werner.kleinhanss@fal.de
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nonlinear object function, however, includes
costs for fixed factors (based on market prices
or opportunity costs). A partial cost approach
with regard to a shorter planning period is
possible. It has turned out that the supply re-
actions induced by the nonlinear object func-
tion do not always converge with the income
effects expressed in FNVA, especially with re-
gard to options of land and quota transfer as
well as structural changes. Due to this prob-
lem, net income (according to profit) or other
income indicators are used complementarily. 
Income effects of 2003 CAP reform
(and further reforms) 
Before going into detail, I would mention that
the modelling outcome indicates main tendencies
although the absolute values differ. Income effects
are sometimes influenced by different modelling
approaches, model specifications, aggregation lev-
els, target years as well as scenario assumptions. 
EU-wide effects 
EU wide effects are available from analyses of
CAPRI and AROPAj. Results of CAPRI, referring to
the probably national implementations in 2009,
show positive income effects for all regions but
one. They are relatively high in the north-west of
the UK and northern Finland. It might be induced
by adjustments in the beef and sheep sector and
probably positive price effects. Relatively low (pos-
itive) income effects are calculated for the Mediter-
ranean region, which might be determined by
income losses in the durum wheat sector.
In a further project, CAPRI has been extended
with a farm type module and to the EU 25 (27).
Each region is represented by a number of repre-
sentative farm types. Referring to Agenda 2000, the
CAP reform induces positive income effects for
farm types ‘specialised arable crops, specialised
livestock and mixed cropping livestock’. Slightly
negative income effects are calculated for perma-
nent crops and specialised granivores farms. Full
decoupling induces further positive income effects
of 0.5 to 3.4 % points. 
Aggregated results for EU-15 MS are also avail-
able based on the LP farm group model AROPAj re-
alised within the GENEDEC project. The model ex-
cludes permanent cropping farms (and horticulture)
and therefore represents roughly three quarters of
UAA. Further, it doesn’t take modulation into ac-
count. Price scenarios are based on ESIM (realised
within IDEMA), which for sheep seems to be excep-
tionally favourable. Income effects (expressed in
Gross Margins) under the scenario ‘National Imple-
mentation’ vary between -4 % for the Netherlands
and 22 % for Spain. They might be even higher
under full decoupling; however the latter might be
overestimated as no compulsory set-aside has been
assumed for this scenario. 
Income effects in some Member
States based on GENEDEC 
More detailed results are available for four MS
based on models developed by GENEDEC part-
ners. Price projections are based on ESIM. Al-
though efforts in harmonization the models vary
by type (LP: Ireland, others PMP), income indica-
tors (Gross Margin, FNVA) and comparative sce-
nario analysis with regard to the base or target
years. In addition, the FAL included the sugar mar-
ket reform using ad hoc price estimates for sugar
beet. 
Aggregate changes of Gross Margins for re-
gions of Spain show income losses in only one re-
gion. The other quarters of the regions shows
increasing incomes up to 5 %, 10 %, or more. Full
decoupling leads to slightly higher incomes. 
The model used for Ireland (full decoupling,
historical reference) is an LP model which has
been run for all FADN farms. The spread of Gross
Margins is derived from the results expelled for dif-
ferent farms types and sizes. On average, positive
income effects can be deduced for dairy farms; this
is also true for larger beef farms. Sheep farms show
income increases between 5 and 25 %. There is
no high variation of income effects in arable farms. 
An analysis at the University of Parma shows
positive income effects (Gross Margin) in the North
of Italy, which is ascribed to the milk market re-
form (milk premia greater than price-induced rev-
enue reductions). Income losses of 10 and 5 %
have to be expected in the regions Centre and
South which mainly result from the arable crop
sector (particularly Durum wheat). 
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The analyses for Germany were carried out
with FARMIS. They include the sugar market re-
form which induces less favourable income effects.
Under the scenario National Implementation with
full transformation into the Regional Model, enti-
tlement levels are unified for all eligible UAA, but
differentiated by Laender. 
On average, an increase of FNVA by 1 %
arises. Grazing livestock, arable cropping and
mixed farms will have income losses up to 4 %,
while income increases by 8 % in pig and poultry
farms. Redistributions of direct payments are ex-
pressed by the income effects of dairy farms: farms
with up to 25 cows show 6 % higher incomes
which can be explained by increases of direct pay-
ments and higher beef prices. In larger dairy farms,
however, negative income effects can be recorded.
Partial decoupling of headage premia and/or for
arable crops induces less favourable income effects.
For the analysis of redistribution effects of the
German dynamic hybrid model we have to go back
to simulations based on the whole sample of FADN
farms. The initial phase (static hybrid model) in-
duces only minor changes, as the main part of beef
premia, milk and sugar premia are paid as farm in-
dividual top-ups. After complete transformation in a
Regional Model, a strong redistribution of direct
payments appear. Farms specialised in bull fattening
or dairy have to expect strong reduction of direct
payments. Before implementation of the sugar mar-
ket reform, specialised sugar beet producer gained
by premium redistribution. With sugar market re-
form income losses are induced; they would be
only half if entitlements were based on historical
references instead of applying the Regional Model. 
In addition, it has to be mentioned that (based
on our analysis) the regional model leads to in-
creasing rental land prices especially for grassland
and therefore income transmission in favour of
land owners. 
Finally, some results for other countries: 
• France: small income increases in Arable
Crop farms;
• AgriPolis (IDEMA): Results for select regions
in France, Germany and Sweden also show
positive income effects of the CAP reform; 
• Model analyses for Poland prove income in-
creases by 50 % mainly due to the increase
of direct payments level in 2013;
• The income projections of the Commission
show income increases in NMS (10) of ap-
proximately 25 %. 
Conclusions with regard to the
Health Check 
Assuming that the health check will not be a
far-reaching reform as the Mid-Term Review (MTR)
and no additional direct payments will be paid:
Market policy 
• Abolition of the cereal intervention or
arrangement as a safety net: No negative in-
come effects have to be expected at the
present price level and price expectations. 
• A reduction in the base price for beef (safety
net) could become necessary with regard to
the reduction of import duties. This would
lead to income losses; it is, however, only
relevant in connection with WTO decisions. 
• Abolition of compulsory set-aside: Removes
restrictions in connection with coupled
arable crop premia. Positive income effects
expected. Application of the measure only
to full decoupling would create incentives
in phasing-out partial decoupling in the
arable crop sector. 
• Milk quota system: Phasing-out via quota
increase, reduction of intervention price
and reduction of super levy, leading to price
induced income losses in the medium term. 
Direct payments 
• From partial towards full decoupling: positive
income effects, removing the distortions of
competition in the beef sector within the EU. 
• Historical versus regional references: Re-
gional model, less favourable income ef-
fects than the historic SFP, redistribution of
direct payments in favour of ‘other land
user’, increase of land rental prices. 
Further development of the SFP as a static hy-
brid model seems to be worthwhile (different enti-
tlement level for arable and grassland, regional
differentiation, individual top-ups for the main part
of headage and milk premiums).
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Modulation proposals: further increase
(10 %), upper limit of DP per farm 
• Income losses for farms with DP > 5000
Euros, small income effects via Pillar 2 pay-
ments, 
• Capping would induce drastic income
losses especially in large farms in Eastern
Germany. 
Recommendation: Digressive modulation
with respect to volume of DP and / or DP per
AWU. 
Final considerations 
Income effects are caused by several influenc-
ing factors of which CAP is important. Due to step-
wise implementation of 2003 CAP reform and time
lags in statistical and FADN data, income effects
can only be assessed based on model analyses (at
the moment). Results are partly influenced by
model type, aggregation level and scenario as-
sumptions. Decoupling induces positive income
effects (full decoupling > partial decoupling; his-
torical reference > Regional Model).
Conclusions with regard to model-
ling and scenarios
• FADN to be completed by national FADN
LAs (if national data are more detailed in
I/O, regional scale) and expertise of national
experts.
• Harmonised modelling: 
- Network of (national) models. 
- EU-wide model (i.e., CAPRI), modelling
centralised but connected with a network
of national experts.
• Scenarios: FAPRI-like market and price pre-
dictions and specification of baseline (and
policy) scenarios (i.e., managed by IPTS or
other centres). Standard baselines should be
used for the test and validation of (national)
models.
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Historical Distributions of Direct Payments in the EU-15 and
Modelled Consequences of Alternative Implementations of
the Single Farm Payment
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ERWIN SCHMID*, FRANZ SINABELL† AND MARKUS F. HOFREITHER*
Introduction 
Until 1992, market price support and supply
control policies were the major tools of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP). The weaknesses of
this policy conception to reach allocative and dis-
tributive policy objectives have been extensively
criticised by economists during the last decades.
A proposed solution was ‘decoupling’, which
started with the MacSharry reform in 1992 and
gained full momentum with the 2003 CAP reform.
Today, direct payments paid according to individ-
ual entitlements obtained during the reference pe-
riod 2000-2002 are the most important agricultural
policy tool. From a financial perspective, these
“single farm payments” are either fully or at least
partially decoupled and thus avoid many of the
negative characteristics of both market price policy
and the payments based on historical areas and
heads of livestock after 1992 (OECD 2006a and
2006b). 
Fully decoupled payments are deemed to
have minimal or no allocative effects and hence
can be considered as pure income support. Thus,
these payments are elements of a distributive pol-
icy. Such policies aim at correcting market out-
comes according to politically determined
objectives, usually through transferring money
from richer to poorer households. If these CAP
payments can be considered as a distributive pol-
icy tool in its very meaning, similar redistributive
outcomes should be observable as well. 
This short paper summarises two working pa-
pers from Schmid et al. (2006) and Schmid and
Sinabell (2006) and is therefore structured accord-
ingly. In the first part, we compare the distribution
of direct payments for farm holdings across EU
Member States using Gini-coefficients and Lorenz
curves. For Austria we show in detail how market
incomes, social transfers, direct payments and
other CAP transfers are contributing to farm house-
hold incomes. Using micro-data of Austrian farm
households we show the consequences of direct
payments on the distribution of market income
and incomes of other sources. In the second part,
we focus on the alternative implementations of the
Single Farm Payments (SFP) as introduced in 2005
using these and other data and FAMOS (Farm Op-
timisation System). Comparing a base-run in 2003
with the actual ‘partial decoupling historic model’
and two alternatives in 2008 (full decoupling and
historic model and full decoupling and the flate-
rate regional model) we show the distributional
implications of alternative policy choices. The
paper finishes with conclusions and policy recom-
mendations. 
Data and methods 
Established information systems for instance
the farm accountancy data network (FADN), the
economic accounts for agriculture (EAA), or the in-
come of the agricultural households sectors (IAHS)
to measuring the effects of CAP on farm incomes
are hardly adequate for analyzing distributional
outcomes, as recently maintained by the Court of
Auditors (2004). In preparing the 2003 CAP re-
form, EU Commissioner Franz Fischler infringed a
hitherto off-limits information barrier. He released
fairly detailed data about the distribution of direct
payments to foster a political climate to limit the
size of high-end CAP payments and thus to reduce
the regressive nature of the CAP regime with the
2003 reform. A similar strategy is followed by the
European Commission in starting the “European
Transparency Initiative” in 2005, which aims to
“increase openness and accessibility of EU institu-
tions, raise awareness over the use of the EU
* Institute for Sustainable Economic Development, University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, Feistmantelstrasse 4, 1180
Vienna, Austria. E-mails: erwin.schmid@boku.ac.at and markus.hofreither@boku.ac.at.
† Austrian Institute of Economic Research, Box 91, 1103 Vienna, Austria. E-mail: franz.sinabell@wifo.ac.at.
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budget and make the institutions of the EU more
accountable to the public” (CEC, 2006). Indicative
figures on the distribution of aid according to Reg.
(EC) No 1259/1999 for EU-25 Member States are
available for the year 2005. For EU-15 Member
States data are available from 2000 to 2004 (for
Greece there are missing data). 
For our quantitative analysis we use the
dataset for 2001 which includes 14 EU Member
States. Based on these Eurostat data on the alloca-
tion of direct payments among farms in different
classes, we have derived estimates on two meas-
ures of inequality: Lorenz curves and Concentra-
tion Ratios (CR). CR range between zero (absolute
equality) and one (absolute inequality) of transfers
and we express them as percentages. 
Direct payments are only one source of in-
come for farm households and therefore an over-
all assessment of the distributional consequences
of these instruments must include the other
sources of income as well. To measure the distrib-
utional effects of various income sources, we use
MAD (mean absolute difference), a measure which
is robust even if negative incomes are involved.
This measure is invariant to equal absolute
changes in all incomes. For instance, if all farms
have got the same amount of payments (flat-pay-
ment per farm) then they receive the same level of
support regardless of their current resource endow-
ments (e.g. land, labour), production decisions, or
income situation. Such a transfer would not
change the MAD measure and may be judged as
distributionally neutral, because it has no effect on
absolute inequality. For this analysis we use the
Austrian bookkeeping farm records from 2000 to
2002. In this analysis, average figures for 2,572
bookkeeping farms are calculated from the three-
year panel record to offset annual anomalies. The
bookkeeping data do not exclude incomes from
other sources than agriculture, as is the case in
many other countries which collect FADN data.
Therefore, a large share of total income of the farm
household – including social transfers and pension
and non-farm activities – are recorded. 
For the analysis of alternative SFP implemen-
tations we use FAMOS (Farm Optimisation System;
Schmid, 2004), which is a data-modelling system
that simulates the decision making process of
about 6,800 typical farms on the basis of historical
and alternative production and income possibili-
ties for typical farms in Austria. Alternative produc-
tion and income possibilities include agricultural
and forestry production, secondary and off-farm
income activities, subsidy and transfer payments.
All instruments of CAP and measures of the pro-
gramme for rural development, in particular the
agri-environmental programme and less favoured
area payments, are modelled. FAMOS aims to find
the optimal combination of production and in-
come activities, which are contingent on quality
and quantity of resource endowments (e.g. land,
capital and labour) and available production tech-
nologies. Endowments and production and in-
come activities of individual farm models are
primarily based on observed data. The data pool is
based on micro data of the IACS (Integrated Ad-
ministration and Control System) from 1999 to
2005. Various agricultural censuses (from 1990,
1995 and 1999) provide farm level information on
historic land and livestock endowments. Data of
the EAA (Economic Accounts for Agriculture) from
1988 to 2004 are used to guarantee consistency
with national accounts at the sector level. Data
analysis of the Austrian bookkeeping farms and
standard gross margins from 2000 to 2003 provide
estimates on farm specific production technolo-
gies. We make the assumption that relative price
wedges observed between conventional and or-
ganic commodity will remain constant until 2008.
The commodity price projections for 2008 are
based on OECD forecasts. Each of the modelled
farms is a special case of only one general farm
model implemented in GAMS (General Algebraic
Modelling System). 
Major results 
The distribution of direct payments has var-
ied significantly across EU-15 countries. The in-
equality measures show that some countries
(among them Finland [CR = 49.5], Luxembourg
[CR = 49.8], The Netherlands [CR = 57.7], Den-
mark [CR = 58.2]) have comparable low levels of
concentration, while Portugal (CR = 87.1), United
Kingdom (CR = 75.5), Spain (CR = 75.3) and Ger-
many (CR = 71.2) have very high ones. On aver-
age of 14 EU members, 20 % of farm holdings
received 80 % of direct payments in 2001. The
Lorenz Curves of some selected EU Member
States are shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Lorenz curves for direct payments and farm holdings in selected EU Member States
and in EU-14 in 2001
Source: Eurostat (2005); own calculations.
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The analysis of Austrian bookkeeping farmers
on distributional consequences by income source
reveals that the average agricultural market income
per farm (defined as revenues of agricultural com-
modities net of expenses and depreciation) is 10.8
thousand Euros of the whole sample. Agricultural
market income was negative in the first quintile of
farms. Without any additional sources of income,
these farms would go out of business. The MAD of
the agricultural market income is 20.5 thousand
Euros which is used as a benchmark. When we
add direct payments according to Reg. (EC) No
1259/1999 to the agricultural market income (6.7
thousand Euros on average per farm) the MAD in-
creases from 20.5 to 22.2 thousand Euros. A higher
MAD indicates that the direct payments favour
those farmers more that have higher agricultural
market incomes in the first place. When all other
CAP transfers are taken into consideration (the sum
of direct payments, less favoured areas payments
and agri-environmental payments) the MAD in-
creases further, reaching 24.9 thousand Euros.
Thus CAP payments taken all together and direct
payments in particular, increase the level of in-
come inequality in the sample of Austrian book-
keeping farms. Other sources of income (most
notably social transfers and pensions) neither con-
tribute to inequality nor do they make incomes
more equal, the MAD remains at the level of agri-
cultural market income plus CAP transfers which is
24.9 thousand Euros.
The comparative static policy analysis of al-
ternative SFP implementations has included a
base-run scenario (observed situation in 2003), the
Austrian implementation in 2008 (historic model
with partially decoupled premiums) and two alter-
native implementations of full decoupling scenar-
ios in 2008. The FAMOS model results show that
farm net-returns are lowest with the Austrian par-
tial implementation of the single farm payments in
place compared to the alternatives (full decoupling
historic model and regional flat rate model). Aus-
trian policy makers obviously put more emphasis
on maintaining certain production activities (e.g.
suckler cows) in distinct regions compared on
gaining higher average farm net-returns. The ‘full
decoupling with the flat–rate regional model’
would have lead to more egalitarian outcomes:
farms in mountainous regions, smaller and organ-
ically producing ones would have benefited from
such an implementation in Austria.
Conclusions 
We use the evidence on the distribution of di-
rect payment of the CAP to draw three major con-
clusions concerning ‘single farm payments’ which
have been introduced in 2005 based on the level of
transfers during the reference period 2000-2002:
• ‘single farm payments’ are constructed in a
manner to minimise production incentives,
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the most important instrument of the CAP
(from a financial perspective) has therefore
(almost) no allocative effects;
• in EU-15 Member States, the largest share
of ‘single farm payments’ reaches a small
number of holdings; in some of them, the
number of privileged units is very small; 
• evidence from Austria suggests that direct
payments (and most likely ‘single farm pay-
ments’) are not contributing to more equal
farm household incomes. 
We use measures of inequality in this analysis
but we do not advocate that direct payments (or
the ‘single farm payment’) should be equally dis-
tributed among farmers who qualified for them
through historical coincidence at a given date.
Such a claim would neither contribute to the ob-
jectives of the CAP, nor would an equal distribu-
tion be more socially acceptable than the observed
ones. However, our findings shall contribute to a
discussion on the long term perspectives of the EU
common agricultural policy which seriously takes
into consideration distributive consequences of
CAP payments. Such a discussion will prevail in
the EU because the peculiar distributive conse-
quences of CAP payments have attracted concerns
among non-agricultural economics researchers
(e.g. Sapir et al., 2003) and the general public (see
e.g. Baldwin, 2005).
A couple of suggestions have been discussed
how to mitigate this situation. One suggestion con-
centrates on the size of holdings in curtailing direct
payments for larger ones. This suggestion has al-
ready found its way into practical policy making
in the EU (this regulation is called ‘modulation’).
Yet, the obvious weakness of such an approach is
that farmers are able to respond quite easily, e.g.
by formally dividing a farm into different legal en-
tities. From an economic perspective, such an ap-
proach is likely to have negative allocative effects
by influencing the performance of farms accord-
ing to their size. So, at best, this approach can be
seen as a temporary solution.
Another suggestion, which tries to overcome
some of the drawbacks of the modulation ap-
proach focuses on the labour input of farms. The
basic intention is that transfers in farming in the
end should support people, not products or own-
ers of land. But also in that case, direct payments
related to labour input will induce reactions in the
form of incentives to artificially increase officially
counted farm labour. Farmers could include fam-
ily members, but also by engaging employees for
service activities which then can be sold to non-
agricultural firms. One solution could be to re-
place actual labour inputs by a transparently
calculated representative values. This, however,
would be seen as a direct link between production
and support and may thus cause problems with re-
spect to the WTO green box status of such pay-
ments.
Single farm payments (the substitutes of di-
rect payments from 2005 on) are only paid if
farmers abide by a set of production standards
(‘cross compliance’). These rules have been tied
with environmental, food safety and animal wel-
fare standards. Thereby, such payments overcome
the status of a simple income transfer and thus get
fortified in political discussions. Yet, scientific ev-
idence points out that this way of securing public
goods is highly inefficient and should be replaced
by better profiled specific programs within the
“second pillar” of CAP. Choices on the decou-
pling strategy (partial or full decoupling) have ef-
fects that go beyond the agricultural sector.
Coupled direct payments have the following con-
sequences: more resources (land, labour and op-
erating inputs) are used for the particular activity
and outputs are slightly higher (in Austria beef
production). Upstream and downstream indus-
tries as well as regional labour markets are there-
fore affected in different ways depending on how
the CAP reform is actually implemented. From
such an angle it looks that agricultural ministers
in EU Member States made deliberate choices
concerning the consequences for their rural
economies.
From an economic point of view, the key
question is whether and under what circumstances
the EU should continue such a specific, sectoral
income policy in the long-run. The general opinion
among (agricultural) economists is that direct pay-
ments which originate in compensations for his-
toric price cuts etc. should be granted only
temporarily. Direct payments, which focus on the
provision of public goods or address externalities,
should become elements of the “second pillar”
and should be subject to strict monitoring and
evaluation procedures.
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Using the OECD PEM to Investigate Land Market Changes
Resulting from the Introduction of the SFP
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Introduction
The OECD Policy Evaluation Model (PEM) is
a tool designed to connect the information in the
OECD Producer Support Estimate (PSE) database
to economic outcomes such as production, trade
and welfare. The PEM considers the different ways
that agricultural policies may be implemented, as
characterised by the PSE classification system and
reflects those differences in a simple economic
model containing commodity and factor markets
as well as world trade. In this way, it is making use
of the information contained in the PSE classifica-
tion system in order to characterise the effects of
different policy types.
The market for land as an input into the pro-
duction process is of particular interest. This is for
two reasons. First, many modern agricultural poli-
cies are directed at and have their first incidence in
the land market. Second, agricultural policies may
be expected to become capitalised in land markets
to varying degrees depending on their implemen-
tation, making land market changes a key vehicle
through which the effects of agricultural policy
play out. 
In using the PEM to investigate the impacts of
the new Single Payment Scheme (SPS) in the Euro-
pean Union, a first consideration must be the basis
upon which this payment is made. The SPS is im-
plemented differently in different member states;
either based on historical payment levels received
by a farmer, or a fixed amount per-hectare for an
entire region, or a hybrid approach mixing the two.
In any case, once the amount of a payment entitle-
ment is established (entitlements must be activated
by being connected with land) it does not vary
with respect to the production choice of the
farmer. In this way, the different approaches to im-
plementing the SPS affect the distribution of pay-
ments, but not their impact on production choice.1
The SP is connected to land and so finds its
first incidence in the model in the land market.
Since the SP does not directly influence produc-
tion choice, it must not directly alter relative prices
for land used for the production of different com-
modities. Thus, for the list of allowed commodities
(some production exceptions apply to land con-
nected to an SP entitlement), the payment must
cause a uniform inflation of land values. The
amount of this inflation is chosen so the total ex-
penditure on the SPS equals the total change in
land values. Thus, the SP affects relative prices be-
tween included and excluded commodities, but
not across the set of permitted uses of the land.
This approach focuses on the economic impacts
of the SP at the margin and not its distributional
aspects.
Taken alone, the impact of introducing the
SPS on land markets in the model is modest as the
payment is broadly based, excepting only fruit and
vegetable production and the net supply elasticity
of all land is very small as a result (Figure 2). In the
PEM, total land area in agriculture is fixed; that is
it has an elasticity of zero. The larger a sub-group
of total land that is affected by a policy, the smaller
will be the net elasticity and the resulting supply
response. 
* Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2 rue Andre Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France. E-mail: roger.mar-
tini@oecd.org. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent those of the OECD or its member coun-
tries. The OECD produced a report in 2004 titled “Analysis of the 2003 CAP reform” which is available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/42/32039793.pdf The analysis in this study is based on a different approach designed to illustrate the
effect of different policy packages in the model.
1 Some claim that under imperfect capital markets, the increased liquidity provided by the SPS will influence the production choices of
farmers. In this case, the different implementations of the SPS would be relevant, and the impact of the SPS greater than otherwise.
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Figure 2: Effect of SPS on land area
Source: OECD PEM.
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The total effect of the CAP reform on land use
must also take into consideration the impact of re-
moving the payments that were replaced by the
SPS. For the interest of simplicity, rather than repre-
senting all the different options chosen by the mem-
ber countries in implementing the CAP, a simple
scenario is used where the maximum decoupling
option is applied to the EU-15 as a whole. This sce-
nario implies a reduction in area payments that ap-
plied only to crop land used for certain commodi-
ties and has a somewhat less even distribution then
that assumed for the SPS. The result is that land use
changes relatively significantly when these pay-
ments are removed. Producers shift away from using
their land for crops eligible for the area payments
to other arable crops and pasture uses (Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Land use changes after elimination of Area Payments
Source: OECD PEM.
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Consider the combined effect of the removal
of pre-existing area payments (and payments based
on animal numbers) and the introduction of the
SPS; that is, a full CAP reform scenario. The effect
of this policy package on land area is significantly
moderated compared with the removal of area
payments alone (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: CAP reform impact on land use by commodity type
Source: OECD PEM.
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In Figure three, the taller burgundy-coloured
bars recapitulate the results shown in Figure 2. The
smaller light bars overlaid on top of these show the
effects of the full CAP reform scenario; the visible
dark area represents the difference between the
two. The shift from Cereals Oilseeds and Protein
(COP) crops to other uses is nearly half the amount
in percentage terms in the full CAP scenario com-
pared with removing area payments only. The dif-
ference between the two is that the CAP scenario
includes the SPS payment. But we saw earlier that
the Single Payment had only a small impact on
land use and one with a very different pattern of ef-
fect than shown in Figure 3. What explains this dif-
ference? There are two main axes of effect of these
policies—between different land uses (land substi-
tution) and between land and other inputs (relative
factor intensity). The older area payments influence
both of these axes: relative land prices are altered
and land is made relatively cheap compared to
other factors. The single payment influences only
the relative cost of land with respect to other fac-
tors but not between land uses. The increase in the
relative price of land compared with other factors
of production when area payments are removed is
largely reversed by the introduction of the single
payment. This leaves the relative land price effect
of the area payments as the dominant factor in the
results. So, the decoupled payment reduces the ef-
fect of removing the area payment.
Payments such as the SPS in the European
Union are typically considered more decoupled
from production by virtue of their historical basis
and lack of major constraints on production
choice. Indeed, OECD estimates of the impacts of
these policies indicate that they are minimally dis-
torting of production choice. However, the impact
of these policies when introduced as part of a
larger policy package such as the reform of the
CAP that was introduced in 2003, can be much
different as a result of the interactions between
policies. In this case, it was observed that the SPS
acted to moderate the impact on land use of the
removal of payments based on area. The result is a
much smaller predicted re-alignment of agricul-
tural production in the EU-15 in response to CAP
reform than one may anticipate when considering
the effects of these policies separately.
28
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Land Market Issues — The Czech Experience
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TOMÁŠ DOUCHA*
Introduction
The briefing focuses on the Czech experience
with regard to:
• Land market development in the EU new
Member States (NMS) after 1989 as one of
the basic conditions for transformation and
restructuring in the agricultural sector;
• Links between agricultural policy support
and farm structure development and land
prices, particularly after EU accession;
• Needs for future research in these fields.
Land market development after 1989
Land market development in the NMS reflects
the two starting dates: 1989 as the year when the
basic socio-economic transformation started and
2004 as the year when the NMS joined the EU.
Owing to the relatively short period after
1989, land market development has been influ-
enced by historical consequences, termed path de-
pendencies, which are country-specific. These
dependencies have negative impacts on land mar-
ket development, as usual. From a policy stand-
point the dependencies can be classified as
“unchangeable” (meaning very rigid and only
changeable — if at all — in the very long term) and
“changeable” by adequate policy measures. The
problem is that — as a rule — there are more pol-
icy failures hindering land market development
whether after 1989 or after 2004. The path de-
pendencies together with policy failures have led
to relatively very high transaction costs and imper-
fect competition on the land market.
Path dependencies
Examples of negative path dependencies can
be given based on the Czech experience:
• The difference between land ownership reg-
istration and land use registration. The ele-
mentary ownership units are represented by
individual parcels (plots); the elementary
land use units are represented (after EU ac-
cession as the units eligible for EU direct
payments) by land blocks. The physical
boundaries of the parcels and the blocks do
not correspond. The sum of all parcels
amounts to about 4.3 million ha of agricul-
tural land and represents the Agricultural
Land Fund (ALF). The sum of all land blocks
amounts to about 3.5–3.6 million ha and
represents the Utilised Agricultural Area
(UAA). The difference, 0.7–0.8 million ha,
is is mainly caused by the disagreement be-
tween land registered in cadasters and the
land registered as utilised agricultural land
(in the register for processing applications
for agricultural subsidies). This dependency
can be classified as “unchangeable”, being
partly solved by land consolidations (see
below).
• The private ownership of land, except for
land expropriated after 1948 to large farms,
was not abolished during the communist
regime, but ownership registration was in-
terrupted (after 1964). Subsequently, rights
of use almost totally overwhelmed property
rights. A special situation exists in the Czech
border regions, with about 10% of parcels
still without ownership identification (as a
consequence of the expulsion of Germans
after World War II). These dependencies —
except for ownership identification in the
border regions — are “changeable” in prin-
ciple, being solved by restitution of property
rights and property titles just after 1989.
• The extreme ownership fragmentation as a
consequence of the two land reforms after
1918: there are about 3 million land owners
* Research Institute of Agricultural Economics (VÚZE), Mánesova 75, 120 58 Prague 2, Czech Republic. Email: doucha@vuze.cz.
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(compared with a high concentration in
land use). This is a typical “unchangeable”
dependency. 
• About 20% of the ALF remained in state
ownership (administered by the Czech Land
Fund), being gradually privatised after 2000
(“changeable” dependency).
• Physical barriers: there are extremely large
fields consisting of several parcels, but with
almost totally abolished physical baulks and
physical access to plots. This is a “change-
able” dependency, being solved by consol-
idation (re-parcelling) of individual
holdings. However, these procedures are
very costly.
Policy failures
Institutional capacity building related to land
market development under the new regime started
just after 1989. The land market has been influ-
enced particularly by the following legislation and
institutions:
• The Land Law (1991) aimed at the restitu-
tion of land-use rights and property rights
(titles). Policy failure: the restitution of prop-
erty rights has still not been completed in
physical terms (financial or physical com-
pensations for built-up land, unidentified
ownership of land in the border regions).
• The establishment of the Czech Land Fund
(1991) for the administration of the state
land and non-land assets to be privatised.
Policy failure: the privatisation of non-land
assets was largely realised in 1994–1995;
the privatisation of land started according to
a special law (with only Czech natural per-
sons eligible) in 2000, creating uncertainty
in farm investments.
• The Land Consolidation Law (1991). Main
policy failure: very slow progress (in spite of
many policy statements, only limited public
finance has been devoted to these proce-
dures and only about 650 property registers
out of a total number of about 13 000 have
completed their complex land consolida-
tion during the last 16 years).
• The Civil and Business Code applied to
transfers of private land, for which real es-
tate agencies have only begun to develop.
• Grants by the Support and Guarantee Farm
and Forestry Fund (SGFFF) for purchases of
private land by farms after 2000 (with only
limited significance for land market devel-
opment).
• The Foreign Exchange Law (1991, 2004,
proposals for amendments 2007): limited
eligibility for foreigners to buy Czech land.
• The Tax Law: taxes on agricultural land.
• Environmental laws, especially the Land
Protection Law and the Nature Protection
Law, creating at national or regional level
various agri-environmental conditions for
farming.
In general, the Czech land market (related to
the ALF) is still undeveloped and imperfect, gener-
ating high transaction costs. The bulk of these costs
can be attributed to extreme ownership fragmenta-
tion in combination with slow progress in land
consolidation. 
Segments of the land market and
land prices
The Czech land market currently consists of
several segments. Each segment has its own insti-
tutional background and regulations: 
A) Lease market (about 85–88% of the UAA)
a) Lease of private land
b) Lease of state land
B) Sale market
a) Sale market with state interference
• Privatisation of state land (supply: about
70 000 ha per year since 2004); tem-
porarily the main factor on the land mar-
ket influencing land prices 
• Sale market based on restitution claims
(primary and secondary holders of enti-
tlements to financial compensation, in-
volved in the privatisation of state land)
• Buy-backs (“expropriation”) of land for
public interests
b) Sale market for private land (ranging from
0.1-0.2% to 1.7% of the UAA per year)
The development of the land market together
with other factors stems from the present specific
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Czech land use/ownership structure. The structure
is characterised by the following main features:
• The strongly dual structure in land use (80%
of the UAA is occupied by about 6%
of farms): extreme land use concentration is
in contradiction with extreme ownership
fragmentation (millions of small land own-
ers). The information asymmetry (owners vs.
users of land) is typical.
• The lease market is largely predominant
(about 85–88% of the UAA is leased to
farms), still not much influenced by policy
support (e.g. through the SGFFF), but more
influenced by land market imperfections.
The consequence: informal suppression of
property rights to the benefit of rights of use,
much higher rents for competitors (espe-
cially individual farms competing for land
with collective farms).
• The high share of lease land has four nega-
tive impacts:
- barriers created to farm restructuring (e.g.
the conversion of arable land into grass-
land and the utilisation of agri-environ-
mental schemes);
- impossibility to use the land as collateral,
particularly for mortgage loans to farms;
- leakage of public support from farms to
land owners, largely living in towns;
- reduced “internalisation” of negative ex-
ternalities (e.g. maintenance of soil for fu-
ture generations).
• Family farms occupy only 13% of the UAA.
Larger individual farms (including partner-
ships and limited liability companies) are
developing (occupying almost 50% of the
UAA), generated from family farms on the
one hand and competing for land with col-
lective farms and with newcomers under
the land privatisation programme on the
other hand. 
• This phenomenon can be recognised also
in Poland with the growing share of subsis-
tence farms (not in the Czech Republic) on
the one hand and larger farms on the other.
• Collective farms (coops and joint stock
companies) occupy about 40% of the UAA,
with a growing share of “managerial farms”
(collective farms where the power of man-
agers prevails over that of the owners). 
• Altogether, about 66% of the UAA is occu-
pied by farms with a “profit/business orien-
tation”; about 33% of the UAA is occupied
by farms with an “income/self-employment
orientation”.
• According to informal information, the
highest demand for land is in the regions
with lower soil quality, but with LFA pay-
ments and payments for agri-environmental
activities. Farming in those regions gener-
ates the highest net value added per AWU.
• The prices of land (only for farming) on the
sale market are strongly (but only temporar-
ily) influenced by the privatisation of land.
For this reason, average land prices on the
market have even fallen after EU accession,
in spite of the huge increase (by about
50–60%) of direct (partly decoupled) pay-
ments. This is quite the opposite of the situ-
ation in Poland. Rents on the lease market
have been growing slightly after EU acces-
sion on average, but reaching a maximum
of only about 20–25% of direct payments
per hectare. 
Needs for future research
Given the real situation on the land market,
particularly in the NMS, and the expected changes
in agricultural policy, future research is needed es-
pecially on the following topics:
• Impacts of different models of decoupling
on land market development;
• Impacts of non-agricultural farm activities
(including production of public goods) on
land market development;
• Interactions between the land market and
the capital (credit) markets.
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Statement on Farmers’ Behaviour and Capital Markets
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EWA RABINOWICZ†
This statement builds on the presentations
made during the workshop session related to farm-
ers’ behaviour and capital markets that I have
chaired. 
The major element of the 2003 Reform was
decoupling of the support from production. Agri-
cultural support, including decoupled payments,
affects production in a number of ways such as
markets effects, risk effects (including risk and in-
surance) and dynamic effects: investment and ex-
pectations. The session on capital markets relates
mainly to the last mentioned but also risk effects
since risk considerations are important determi-
nants of investment behaviour. 
I am going to organise my comments into re-
flections on past policy changes and some for-
ward-looking thoughts related to the health check
and beyond. My comments will mostly connect to
EU-15. In the case of EU-15, the issue is of the im-
pact on investment of a change to a less coupled
support whereas in the case of NMS the dominat-
ing effect is due to the accession and an introduc-
tion of new payments. 
A gradual decoupling of support from produc-
tion has been going on since 1992. It could be ex-
pected that this policy change should have
produced some impact on the level of investments
but as shown by Martin Odening and Silke Huttel
not much can be seen looking at the aggregate
level of investment. However, a lack of any dis-
cernible effects is probably not as surprising at it
may appear at the first sight. The 1992 reform
moved the support from production (output) to the
land input, keeping the total level of support un-
changed. An impact on investment could be ex-
pected if land could be substituted for other inputs
such as machinery. Otherwise, a low degree of
substitutability between land and capital may well
result in a lack of an impact on investment. With a
Leontief or almost a Leontief type of technology it
does not matter what is subsidised. The effect on
production and input use will be the same. With
an unchanged level of support no substantial im-
pacts of any kind can be expected. 
The impact of 2003 reform on investment is
not easy to assess due to many elements involved
and opposing effects that can be expected from
different components. Let me start to add to the ex-
pected effects by looking at production. Werner
Kleinhanss has presented an overview of model re-
sults of anticipated changes in production. By and
large, production will decline but not very much.
However, the impact is believed to vary according
to commodity. Two implications follow: if we be-
lieve that production changes will be limited and
substitutability of production factors is low then
we should also expect that investment should not
change much. However, if the composition of the
output changes, one of the main components of
the reform was that the payments are not longer
linked to specific commodities in order to achieve
a greater market orientation, there may be an im-
pact on investment due to differences in
capital/output ratio between different commodi-
ties.
Statements such as “we do not know for sure”
and “more research is needed” were consistently
repeated during the workshop but are especially
relevant when it comes to investment behaviour.
A review of literature was presented by Martin
Odening including both studies of stated prefer-
ences, in other words plans and expectations and
of revealed preferences: econometric studies and
models that are, however, normative in nature. In
addition, we had a presentation of a study done
commissioned by IPTS (Viaggi and Gomez y
Paloma). As we could see the number of studies is
low, so not much knowledge has been accumu-
lated so far. Moreover, each category of studies has
its particular limitations, which has to be kept in
† Swedish Institute for Food and Agricultural Economics (SLI), Scheelevägen 15 D, 223 63 Lund Sweeden. E-mail: ewa.rabinowicz@sli.lu.se 
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mind while interpreting the results. Econometric
analyses, which at end of the day should consti-
tute the most reliable way of establishing the ef-
fects suffer often from limited variability of the key
explanatory variables. Models are based on as-
sumed behaviour and the empirical underpinnings
of those assumptions are, especially in the case of
investments, often weak. In case of stated prefer-
ences, we all know that farmers not always do
what they say they will do. The answers obtained
from surveys suffer, moreover, from various types
of bias such as strategic behaviour. A combination
of different approaches, as in the IPTS study, which
relied on both modelling and surveys seems there-
fore promising. Nevertheless, it can only be re-
peated, much more analyses on the subject of
investment are needed.
Now some perhaps more speculative com-
ments, related to the “health check”. What will be
the actual outcome of the process it is not know
yet but some issues have been raised. Let me focus
on two of them: modulation and capping of the
support. So far modulation rate is insignificant,
only 5%, but up to 20% has been mentioned in
the political discussions. A modulation of this size
may have profound implications for investment ac-
tivities but it difficult to project the direction. The
modulated money will be transferred to the Pillar
2 of the CAP. Pillar 2 contains a large number of
different measures organised along three axes. The
first one includes inter alia investment support and
support to young farmers. Both measures could be
expected to boost investment activities. Measures
in the second axis on the other hand, tend to
favour extensification and, accordingly, less invest-
ment since the objective is to promote environ-
mentally friendly production and production of
pubic goods related to environment. Even more
difficult is to speculate in possible effects on the
funds which would end in the third axis since
some of them may be allocated to diversification
activities outside agriculture.
Capping, if decided, will reduce payments to
the largest recipients, who presumably invest most,
which may affect their investment behaviour espe-
cially if capital markets are imperfect.
To sum up, investment behaviour of farmers
is an under researched subject and the future
changes of the policy will only increase the knowl-
edge gap.
Te
ch
ni
ca
l R
ep
or
t S
er
ie
s
In
co
m
e 
an
d 
Fa
ct
or
 M
ar
ke
ts
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
20
03
 C
A
P 
R
ef
or
m
 –
 W
or
ks
ho
p 
Pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s
35
Impacts of the 2003 CAP Reform on Pluriactivity 
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Introduction
The goal of this paper is to provide some the-
oretical insights on the effects of the 2003 CAP Re-
form on pluriactivity and on agricultural labour
markets.
The rather scarce existing literature dealing
with the effects of agricultural policy reform on
labour use is generally focussed on decoupling per
se. In this paper, I will take the approach of
analysing the effects on labour use of the overall
common agricultural policy (CAP) reform. The CAP
reform is quite articulated and many details should
be considered in empirical research to evaluate
their impact. Nevertheless, a theoretical analysis
cannot go into all details and needs to identify the
most important features of the policy change. From
this point of view, the approach I will take is con-
sidering the spirit of the 2003 CAP Reform as a
trade off of a coupled support with direct pay-
ments. This is clearly the “philosophy” of the Re-
form itself and it is quite explicit in the norms
prescribing that the budget allocated to coupled
support should shift to Single Farm Payments (SFP).
While coupled payments can take many forms,
from intervention prices to direct payments per
tonne produced to payments per area or animal
head, the view that will be taken here is that their
reduction is theoretically equivalent to a decrease
in the average revenue received by farmers, i.e., is
equivalent to a price decrease. Even when the pay-
ments are area-based, for a given yield their reduc-
tion or abolition is the same as decreasing the
received price. Of course, since following the re-
form the crop mix and the factor use can be
changed, the “price decrease” is not the same for
all farmers, which makes this effect different from
an actual price change that would be the same for
all farmers. Nevertheless, it is convenient to
analyse the effects of the reduction or abolition of
the coupled payments as a price decrease. The
overall impact of the CAP reform will be therefore
analysed as the introduction of a) direct payments,
compensating for b) the price decrease (equivalent
to the abolition or reduction of coupled payments).
Both aspects are to be taken into account.
Theoretical model
To begin, it is convenient to assume a per-
fectly competitive market, where farmers can
freely allocate their family labour to farm and off-
farm work and all adjustments can happen
smoothly. Market imperfections will be examined
below. It will also be assumed that farmers have
no preference for farm rather than for off-farm
work and for simplicity the joint decision-making
within farm households among operators, spouses
and other household members will be ignored. In
other words, the reference model is a separable
model of a single farmer. The model is static and,
more importantly, the analysis does not take into
account the price changes stemming from the CAP
reform. According to the model (Singh et al. 1986;
Huffmann, 1991) the farmer is assumed to max-
imise utility over consumption and leisure, under
income and time constraint. The income constraint
comprises farm income, off-farm wages and non-
labour income. The model is as follows:
(1)
where C is consumption (or, equivalently
under the assumption of a composite good, in-
come); L is leisure; H is a vector of personal vari-
* University of Turin, Department of Economics “S. Cognetti de Martiis” Via Po, 53, I-10124 Torino, Italy. Tel. +39 011 670 44 09, and Cen-
tre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD). E-mail: alessandro.corsi@unito.it.
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ables; ZH a vector of characteristics of the house-
hold; T is total available time; F and M are time
spent working on the farm and off the farm, respec-
tively; Q is the quantity of the good produced by the
farm; p its price; s the coupled payment per unit of
output; X is the vector of hired inputs and R the vec-
tor of their relevant prices; ZF the vector of farm
characteristics; W is off-farm market wage; V is non-
labour income. The utility function and the produc-
tion function are assumed to be well-behaved.
The Kuhn-Tucker maximisation conditions
yield the following on-farm and off-farm participa-
tion conditions and the condition for input use:
(2)
(3)
(4)
where μ and λ are the marginal utilities of
leisure and income, respectively. The first condition
states that participation in farm work (an internal so-
lution) occurs if the marginal value product of farm
work is equal to the leisure-income marginal rate of
substitution (MRS). The second states that participa-
tion in off-farm work occurs if the wage is equal to
the leisure-income MRS. The third is the textbook
condition for input use, i.e. the marginal value prod-
uct of the input is equal to its price.
Impacts of the CAP reform on pluri-
active farms
In a pluriactive farm, equations (2) and (3)
hold as equalities:
(5)
(6)
That is, the marginal value product of farm
labour is equal to the market wage and to the
leisure-income MRS. Using this model, the impact of
a direct payment has long been established: a de-
coupled direct payment is tantamount to an increase
in non-labour income. Hence, assuming leisure is a
normal good, a clear a priori prediction is that a de-
coupled payment will increase the time allocated to
leisure and, hence, decrease total time allocated to
work (El-Osta et al., 2004). This is because increased
income will decrease its marginal utility and there-
fore increase the MRS. Nevertheless, if production
decisions are separable from labour allocation de-
cisions and no change is introduced in farm prices,
total labour allocated to farm work does not change,
since the optimality condition of equality between
the wage rate and the marginal value product of
farm labour is not affected. Hence, for a farmer par-
ticipating in off-farm work, a decoupled direct pay-
ment will decrease off-farm work. 
While direct payments only have a wealth ef-
fect, a decrease in coupled support (i.e., a decrease
in the price of the agricultural output) has both a
wealth and a substitution effect. The decrease in in-
come decreases the MRS, so that the farmer con-
sumes less leisure. At the same time, the decrease in
the marginal value product of family farm labour in-
duces a reduction of on-farm work. Hence, the
overall result is an increase in off-farm work.
As the CAP reform is a combination of an in-
come payment and of a price decrease, the two ef-
fects operate in opposite directions. One has to
add additional hypotheses about the amount of de-
coupled payments relative to the price decrease
following the abolition of the coupled payments.
The most sensible one, in the spirit of the reform,
is that at the farm level the decoupled subsidy ex-
actly compensates for the pre-reform farm income,
i.e., that:
(7)
where Q1 is the pre-reform output and SFP is
the decoupled payment. But even under this as-
sumption, no theoretical prediction on off-farm
work is possible. While on-farm work is unam-
biguously reduced, the new income possibility
curve lies above the original one in the relevant
portion of off-farm work. Therefore, the farmer
consumes more leisure and total work is reduced.
The overall effect on off- farm work depends on
whether the decrease of farm work (depending on
the substitution effect) is larger or smaller than the
decrease in total work (due to the wealth effect)1.
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There are nevertheless indirect effects of the
CAP reform on total off-farm labour supply. They
stem from adjustments of the production mix fol-
lowing the abolition of the coupled support. Farm-
ers will shift from the production of formerly
subsidised output to non-subsidised crops, due to
the elimination of price distortions. Supply of other
crops is therefore likely to grow, which, ceteris
paribus, implies a price drop. Therefore, farmers
non receiving decoupled payments will suffer a
price decrease, with the resulting trend to increas-
ing off-farm labour supply and/or to decreasing use
of waged labour. The magnitude of the indirect ef-
fects obviously depends, in addition to the wealth
and substitution effects in these industries, on the
price changes induced by the adjustments.
Impacts of the CAP Reform on
waged labour
To analyse the effects of the CAP reform on
waged labour, a preliminary distinction needs to
be made, depending on whether waged labour is
a perfect substitute of family labour in farm pro-
duction or not. The former applies if δ(p+s)Q /δF =
a δ(p+s)Q /δFw, where a is a constant and Fw is
waged work. Substitutability of waged for family
work in farm production depends on many factors
including, among others, the type of farming (more
“professional” types of farming, e.g. wine growing,
require high skills in many operations, that waged
work rarely have) and the type of work (seasonal
vs. permanent).
If waged labour is not a perfect substitute of
family labour, then waged work can be considered
as any other input of vector X. If this is the case,
then the effects of the CAP reform are unambigu-
ously a decrease of waged labour. The decoupled
payment accruing to farmers has no wealth effect
on hired labour and the price decrease lowers the
marginal value product of hired labour, so that its
use is decreased (see eqn. 4).
When hired labour is a perfect substitute of
family labour, family and waged labour can be ex-
pressed in equivalent terms. If δ(p+s)Q /δF = a
δ(p+s)Q /δFw, and Ww = b W, where Ww is the wage
paid to hired workers, then the optimality condi-
tion for total labour use on the farm is δ(p+s)Q /δF
= W = a/b δ(p+s)Q /dFw. The optimal quantity of
family labour contributed by the farmer corre-
sponds to the condition W = μ / λ, the complement
to total farm labour is provided by hired workers. 
For a farmer hiring waged work, a decrease in
the output price entails a decrease in total labour
use on the farm, due to lower marginal value pro-
ductivity of labour. At the same time, since income
drops, the farmer consumes less leisure and in-
creases his/her on-farm work time. It follows that
hired work time unambiguously decreases as a re-
sult of a price decrease.
By contrast, a decoupled payment has no ef-
fect on total farm work time, since the marginal
value productivity of labour is not affected. But,
due to the positive wealth effect, a decrease in
family work time is predicted. As a result, a decou-
pled payment unambiguously increases hired
work time.
The overall effect of the CAP reform on waged
work is the result of two components pushing in
opposite directions. Again, assuming a full mone-
tary compensation of the price decrease through
the decoupled payment at the pre-reform level, no
theoretical prediction on waged work is possible.
Total farm work is unambiguously reduced, but the
decoupled payment raises the income possibility
curve of the farmer and his/her on-farm work is re-
duced. The overall effect on waged work depends
on whether the decrease in total farm work (de-
pending on the substitution effect) is larger or
smaller than the decrease in the farmer’s farm work
(due to the wealth effect).
Empirical literature
Overall, the above analysis shows that there are
very few theoretical predictions, if any, on the effects
of the CAP reform on pluriactivity and on agricul-
tural labour markets. Therefore, empirical analyses
are required to assess the effects of the reform. So
far, empirical analysis on this issue has been very
scarce. Within the EU, Ooms and Hall (2005) simu-
late the effects of CAP reform for a sample of Dutch
dairy farms, finding that its impact both on on-farm
(positive) and on off-farm labour supply (negative)
are weak. The result of the increase in on-farm work
is inconsistent with the theory, but the simulation
also included a milk quota increase, which could
explain this result. More research has been produced
on the effects of decoupled subsidies in the USA (El-
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Hosta, Mishra, Ahearn, 2004; Ahearn, El-Hosta,
Dewbre 2006; Dewbre, Mishra, 2002; Serra, Good-
win and Featherstone, 2005; Goodwin and Mishra,
2004). These analyses are generally based on a com-
parison between pre-1996 FAIR Act and the follow-
ing period. The results are mixed. Some are
consistent with the theoretical predictions, like the
result that both coupled and decoupled payments
decrease off-farm work hours or that coupled pay-
ments have a positive effect of on on-farm work,
while the coefficients are not significant for decou-
pled payments (El-Hosta, Mishra, Ahearn, 2004).
Some results are puzzling, like the finding by
Ahearn, El-Hosta, Dewbre (2006) that there was no
significant difference in the impact of different pay-
ment types on off-farm labour participation, which is
negative for both. In general, the magnitude of the
estimated effects is rather small, especially for total
work, which suggests that the wealth effect on total
work is indeed small.
Other factors at play and directions
for further analyses
Of course, factors other than the ones consid-
ered in the above theoretical framework may be at
play, preventing or curbing farmers’ response to
the policy change. Among them, non-pecuniary
returns from living a farming lifestyle have been in-
dicated (Ahearn, El-Hosta, Dewbre, 2006; Key and
Roberts, 2007). Decoupled payments increase
farmers’ wealth and may reduce their risk aversion
and hence their propensity to take on an off-farm
job (Serra, Goodwin and Featherstone, 2005). Ex-
pectations that future payments will also be tied to
past yields and production choices (El-Hosta,
Mishra, Ahearn, 2004) are a possible explanation
for some theoretically puzzling results in the US, a
factor that though is not likely to play a role in the
EU, where the commitment of the EU to the policy
change is very clear. A further point is that an ap-
preciable share of government payments is passed
through to landowners, to a greater extent in the
case of decoupled payments (Goodwin et al.,
2003; Kirwan, 2003; Lence and Mishra, 2003;
Roberts et al., 2003), thus decreasing the wealth
effect of the reform for operating farmers and ren-
dering a net effect of increased off-farm labour and
decreased waged labour more likely. Farmers that
own their land directly benefit of the payments and
for them the wealth effect is at work. In many Eu-
ropean countries, nevertheless, rents are heavily
regulated and rent contracts are on a long-term
basis. In these countries appropriation of the de-
coupled payments by landowners is therefore
likely to be a slow process.
All the factors indicated above are important
issues for research on this topic. I will indicate
some more factors that could be considered.
A major difficulty with the empirical analyses
is that a crucial point in establishing the effects of
the policy change on labour is to what extent de-
coupled payments substitute coupled payments,
since their effects are opposite. The higher the de-
coupled subsidy the larger the wealth effect, which
implies a decrease in off-farm work and an in-
crease in waged work. The larger the decrease in
prices, the larger the substitution effect and, hence,
an increase in off-farm work and decrease in
waged work are more likely. It is therefore crucial
to asses whether the CAP reform led to an “over-
compensation” or an “under-compensation”, rela-
tive to the pre-reform situation. If the decoupled
subsidy more than compensates the decrease in
prices, the former outcome is more likely to pre-
vail; the reverse in case of under-compensation.
Several points are worth noting in this respect.
The most obvious is the measure of the SFP at the
area and farm level. For many products, the CAP
reform dictates that the previous budget allocated
to coupled payments be reallocated to SFP. This
implies that at the macro level there is exact “com-
pensation”. This might not to be the case at the
farm and area level. Comparisons of the pre-re-
form coupled payments with SFP levels might add
information on this point.
Second, all the above theoretical analysis im-
plicitly assumed a single output. As a reaction to
policy change and much in the spirit of the reform
itself, farmers can change their output mix. There
are efficiency gains in quitting or reducing prod-
ucts previously enjoying coupled support. As a re-
sult, the average price decrease after this change
is less severe than if no change in the output mix
was undertaken. This reinforces the wealth effects
relative to the substitution effects.
Third, in most old member states the SFP is set
according to historical entitlements and price vari-
ations in the following period may cause “over- or
under-compensation”. There is a wide variation of
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price trends since the reference period for SFP cal-
culation, which, if crops are not perfectly substi-
tutable, creates “winners” and “losers”, i.e.,
farmers that over- and under-compensate. “Win-
ners” are more likely to decrease off-farm work
and to hire more waged labour; the reverse is true
for “losers”.
A following point worth investigating is the ef-
fects of the policy change in relation to the distribu-
tion of CAP support. CAP support was traditionally
biased in favour of wealthier farms. The CAP reform
apparently is not going to change dramatically this
pattern and inequality might even increase under the
CAP reform (Schmid et al., 2006; von Witzke and
Noleppa, 2007). If this is really the case, the result is
that small farms will be less “compensated” on the
average than large farms and the effects in terms of
increase of off-farm labour are more likely to pre-
vail. A relevant connected question is whether small
farms are more sensitive to non-labour income
changes or to farm labour productivity changes, rel-
ative to large farms. This is also an open question
worth investigating. 
A final relevant issue concerns market imper-
fections. All the theoretical analysis was based on
the assumption of perfect markets, which is obvi-
ously almost never the case in real world. The most
relevant market imperfections for this issue are off-
farm labour rigidities and job availability.
Off-farm work is usually more time con-
strained than on-farm independent work. Except
for overtime, there are seldom open options on
how many hours, or days, to work, especially in
case of waged jobs. Laws, regulations and agree-
ment between employers and trade unions on
working time are quite frequent in European coun-
tries. If off-farm work is assumed to be totally in-
elastic (e.g., 8 hours or none), pluriactive farmers
cannot perform a fine tuning of their work time by
adjusting off-farm work and small adjustments of
total work are only possible on farm work. In such
a situation, the signs of the effects are obviously
the same as in an unconstrained situation, but the
effects are discontinuous2. A decoupled payment,
if large enough, can trigger quitting the off-farm
job and a price decrease, if severe enough, can
lead to taking on an off-farm job and even to dis-
continuing farm operation. Again, “over-compen-
sation” or “under-compensation” from the CAP re-
form is crucial. But on the average the
responsiveness to policy changes is lower than in
an unconstrained situation.
Job availability, both on the supply and on the
demand side, is another important related issue. If
no off-farm job opportunities are available to a
farmer, obviously no adjustment to changing eco-
nomic conditions is possible through off-farm work.
Labour allocation decisions and farm production
choices are not separable. The decoupled payment
has a pure wealth effect, pushing to more leisure and
hence less on-farm work. The decrease in prices has
both a substitution and a wealth effect, with opposite
directions. If the decoupled payment exactly com-
pensates the income loss stemming from the price
decrease at the pre-reform equilibrium, the two
wealth effects vanish, only the substitution effect is at
work and the net effect is a reduction of farm work.
This negative net effect of farm work is likely to dom-
inate in marginal areas where few job opportunities
are available and among older farmers, for which
finding an off-farm job is problematic. But rationing
and transaction costs to participate in off-farm activ-
ities are widespread also in rich areas (Woldehanna
et al., 2000). 
Shortage of waged labour is another possibil-
ity. Until one or two decades ago, waged labour
was difficult to find in some areas, especially in
south Europe. If waged labour is not available, out-
put is lower and farmers’ farm work is greater, than
when hired work is available. If the situation of
hired labour shortage had persisted, the CAP re-
form would have further reduced output and farm-
ers’ work. But in the last decade many immigrant
workers entered the EU, thus alleviating the prob-
lem. This trend has been reinforced by the EU en-
largement and many workers from new member
countries now work in agriculture in old member
countries. This obviously act in the opposite direc-
tion as to farm output and farmers’ on-farm work,
so that in an empirical analysis it will presumably
be very difficult to disentangle the effects of the
CAP reform from those of the larger availability of
waged workers. More so, because many immigrant
workers, especially in southern Europe, work ille-
gally and are not recorded in official data.
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of off-farm labour supply.
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Conclusions
The main message of this paper is that unfor-
tunately there are no clear-cut theoretical predic-
tions on the effects of the CAP reform on
pluriactivity and agricultural labour markets. Its ef-
fects in this respect are therefore to be evaluated
empirically. Nevertheless, it is quite dubious that
the CAP reform will have dramatic effects on pluri-
activity and on waged labour use. The reason is
not only because there are opposite effects of the
reform that are offsetting each other, but also be-
cause the effects of both coupled and decoupled
payments, as estimated by the empirical research
so far, are quite modest. Though, the estimates
concern almost only the US and the coefficients
concerning EU farmers might be different. Regard-
less, the investigation on the way farmers respond
or do not respond to policy changes in allocating
their work time is important, both regards to
changes in agricultural production and in a rural
development perspective. 
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Investment Behaviour and Capital Markets under the 2003
CAP Reform - Some General Considerations
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Relevance of investment behaviour
The understanding of investment behaviour is
important for an economic and policy analysis in
agriculture for several reasons. Firstly, investments
change the farm size which has an impact on prof-
itability and competitiveness due to economies of
size. Secondly, the adoption of new technologies is
frequently realized through investments. This may
shift the production frontier of the farm and its ef-
ficiency. Thirdly, investments and disinvestments
are the main driving forces of structural change in
agriculture. This becomes obvious if one consid-
ers farm foundations, market entries, the conver-
sion of conventional into organic farms, the
termination of production activities or even the re-
tirement from agriculture as special investment
and disinvestment activities. In general, invest-
ments have, once being realized, a long lasting ef-
fect on the economic orientation of the farm.
Determinants of investment behaviour
Economic theory asserts that investments (dis-
investments) are triggered off, if the investment re-
turns exceed (falls below) a particular hurdle rate.
The following factors determine the investment re-
turns and the investment (disinvestment) trigger of
farms in the context of the CAP:
Investment costs: Several measures within the
second pillar have a direct impact on the invest-
ment cost, for example interest rate reductions,
state bails or subsidies to investment finance of en-
vironmental or animal friendly production sys-
tems. In contrast, investment costs may increase
due to bureaucratic regulations inducing transac-
tion costs, for instance, building permissions for
investments in intensive livestock production. Indi-
rect effects may arise if policy instruments affect
the price for investment goods, for example land.
Gross margins of production activities: Changes
in intervention prices are expected to induce declin-
ing producer prices with a higher volatility and
will therefore change the absolute value of the
gross margins of agricultural products as well as
their comparative advantage. Moreover, quotas
restrict production quantities and hinder optimal
output. Further impact from policy measures on
the investment cash flow may arise from produc-
tion requirements, e.g., cross compliance.
Direct payments: Direct payments are only
relevant for the investment decision if they are
coupled with the production activity which is car-
ried out by means of the investment. In general,
fully decoupled payments do not contribute to the
marginal cash flow of an investment. However,
within the option of regionalised decoupling the
value of land is expected to increase and thus, in-
directly affects the marginal cash flow. 
Salvage values: Agricultural investments are
usually very specific and cannot be sold on liquid
markets once they have been purchased, i.e. high
sunk costs accrue. This drives a wedge between in-
vestment and disinvestment triggers. Sunk costs of
specific assets constitute a major reason for path
dependence and slow adjustment processes in
agriculture.
Risk: Investment decisions rest upon expecta-
tions of future cash flows, which are more or less
uncertain whereby intervention prices and other
market regulations in the past reduced producer
price risk. Thus, production branches which have
not been affected by market regulation have been
more risky. Otherwise, products with reduced mar-
ket support within the CAP reform (2003) will be-
come more risky. Since one can reasonably
assume that farmers are risk averse, they will re-
quire risk premia when investing in uncertain pro-
duction activities. In fact, Hinrichs et al. (2007)
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and Pietola and Myers (2000) report a consider-
able investment reluctance of hog producers
which is caused by risk.
This itemisation of investment determinants
shows that it is almost impossible to forecast the
direct impact of a complex policy reform like the
2003 CAP reform, since several factors coexist and
interfere. Hence, the following hypotheses should
be considered with some prudence.
Hypotheses on the impact of the 2003 CAP
Reform on investment behaviour
Long run historic data show that the aggregate
investment volume in EU agriculture is rather sta-
ble (Eurostat 2007). Former changes in the CAP as
the MacSharry reform (1992) or the Agenda 2000
do not seem to have a significant impact on aggre-
gate investments and there is no apparent reason
why this should be the case for the 2003 CAP re-
form. However, this does not mean that this reform
is irrelevant for investment decisions at the farm
level or at a regional level. 
Impact of the CAP Reform on the (relative)
cash flow of important production activi-
ties
The reduction /abandonment of intervention
prices linked with decoupled payments changes
the structure of incremental investment cash flows.
Within the MacSharry reform financial support has
already been decoupled from production intensity
even though some level of production was still re-
quired to claim area or headage payments. Ac-
cordingly, specific investments were necessary to
realize and maintain production. If under the 2003
reform payments are completely (not partially) de-
coupled from production, many investments (e.g.,
livestock barns, machinery) are no longer neces-
sary to continue production and thus to activate
premia. Besides, adjustments of production capac-
ities will happen slowly due to sunk costs. As long
as production revenues cover the variable produc-
tion cost, farmers will continue to produce. Disin-
vestments are realized through depreciation and
defaulted reinvestment. This process may last sev-
eral years depending on the age of the assets.
Hence, the effects of the reform on disinvestments
will be measurable with a time lag. Notwithstand-
ing, in medium term it can be expected that invest-
ments in dairy farming and in beef production will
decline due to decreasing gross margins (Kuepker
et al. 2006; Lethonen, 2004). In contrast, unspe-
cific farm investments (land) or off-farm invest-
ments become more attractive (Peerlings and
Ooms, 2005). However, these tendencies hold for
an average farm. According to a recent survey of
UK milk producers younger farmers, tenant farm-
ers, farmers producing over 1 million litres of milk
per year and specialized dairy farms plan to in-
crease milk production over the next years (Milk
Development Council UK, 2006). It seems likely
that divergence between efficient expanding farms
and less efficient contracting dairy farms can be
observed. The extension of the milk quota and the
expected decline in quota prices as a consequence
of decoupling will accelerate this process. 
Another potential impact of the 2003 CAP re-
form on the investment behaviour comes from
changes of the farmers’ risk exposition. The reduc-
tion of intervention prices will not only decrease
expected producer prices but also increase the
price volatility, since the price distribution is trun-
cated at a lower level. Hence, the downside risk
increases and farmers require higher risk premia
before they invest. Schokai and Moro (2005), for
example, estimate a decline of the capital stock of
Italian crop farms about 25 percent due to an “in-
surance effect”.
It should be noted that the predicted price ef-
fects of the 2003 CAP reform may be superposed
by external market developments. For example,
OECD (2004 p. 43) conjectures a decline in the
producer prices for cereals and a clear movement
from crop land to pasture. Such an extensification
would also reduce the necessary machinery ca-
pacity. However, in Germany, this development
could not be observed until now, since markets for
renewable energy boomed in the last two years
and prevented grain prices from falling.
Moreover, the principal impacts of the CAP
reform on investment behaviour and adjustment
processes may be diluted, because farmers do not
behave completely rational. SWINBANK et al. (2004)
point out that decoupled payments provide farms
with an additional income that delays cash prob-
lems in inefficient farms. Farmers not bothering
about marginal cost and revenues might continue
producing longer than optimal.
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Speed of structural change 
As stated above, agricultural structures are
characterized by a high degree of inertia. A major
reason is the asset specificity and the low fungibil-
ity of many production factors in agriculture. De-
coupling of payments may affect this fungibility
and thereby influence the decision to give up pro-
duction or even to retire from agriculture. Addi-
tionally, a flexible transfer of premium rights
without specific production obligations will prob-
ably increase the market value of durable assets
and thereby increase the incentive to leave the sec-
tor. Actually, Jongeneel (2006) shows by means of
a simulation model that the exit rates of dairy farms
in the Netherlands and West Germany are higher
under the conditions of the Luxembourg reform
compared to a continuation of the Agenda 2000.
In any case farmers’ reluctance to invest or
disinvest does not necessarily express ignorance of
profit opportunities or market frictions. It rather is
compatible with dynamically optimal behaviour.
Hence, a slow capacity adjustment per se provides
little justification for state intervention. Such meas-
ures should for instance be justified by environ-
mental or regional policy targets. If, on the other
hand, it is desirable to speed up adjustment
processes and structural changes in intensive live-
stock production for whatever reasons, the consid-
erable inertia which can be attributed to this
sector, has to be taken into account.
Capital markets and access to debt
capital
One might conjecture that an indirect effect
of the 2003 CAP reform occurs via the cost of cap-
ital and the access to debt capital. If agricultural
assets loose value due to the reform, land in partic-
ular for those Member States that opted for the
farm individual decoupling by the single farm pay-
ment, farmers can provide less collateral when ap-
plying for loans. Moreover, credit rating systems,
in principle, are sensitive to the economic situa-
tion of the industry in which the credit applicant is
embedded. That means if the profitability of agri-
cultural production is deteriorated by unfavourable
political or economic circumstances the access to
debt capital worsens. This would be an important
issue for growing farms showing a rather low eq-
uity share. However, it is unlikely that such effects
will be pronounced, at least on average. Firstly, the
design of financial support has changed with the
2003 CAP reform, but not its total level. Hence,
there is no withdrawal of subsidies from the whole
sector. Moreover, it is not clear if the value of land
as important collateral will actually fall. Finally, ac-
cording to the new Basle accord (Basle II) banks
should put less emphasis to the existence of collat-
eral when assessing the credit worthiness of their
clients. Compared with other industries the prob-
ability of credit default is low in agriculture.
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Intended Farmers Responses to Decoupled CAP Payments in Se-
lected EU-15 and New Member States: what Policy Lessons?
Te
ch
ni
ca
l R
ep
or
t S
er
ie
s
ELODIE DOUARIN*, SOPHIA DAVIDOVA†, ALISTAIR BAILEY†, MATHEW GORTON‡ AND LAURE LATRUFFE§
This briefing emphasises some of the findings
of a study of the impact of decoupled payment sys-
tem on farmers’ intentions in five EU Member
States carried out within the FP6 IDEMA project
(Impact of Decoupling and Modulation on the En-
larged EU). The analysis draws on primary survey
data and farm accounting records. IDEMA project
collected a unique dataset of farmers’ intentions
regarding their planned activities in the post-ac-
cession/single payment system era in five EU
Member States (England, France, Lithuania, Slova-
kia and Sweden). For full details about the survey
data, their analysis and interpretation of results see
FP6 IDEMA, Deliverable 14, June 2007.
The choice of countries incorporates a mix-
ture of EU-15 and NMS. Primary data were col-
lected on intentions to exit from/stay within
agriculture; change the amount of land farmed and
production mix. Data were also collected about
farmers’ objectives, values and opinions concern-
ing policy support. Primary data collection was
linked to FADN records to enhance the under-
standing of the impact of farms’ structural charac-
teristics and past performance on future intentions
and reduce the amount of data which had to be
collected during interviews. To understand the spe-
cific effects of the switch in policy, farmers were
asked to state their intentions under three main
policy scenarios:
a) Continuation of policies under Agenda 2000
in EU-15 / pre-accession policies in NMS.
This provides the baseline scenario of what
farmers would have done under continua-
tion of the previous policy environment. 
b) Intentions under the 2003 CAP reform as
implemented in each country: the single
farm payment (SFP) in the EU-15 and the
single area payment (SAP) plus national
top-ups in the NMS.
c) Intentions under full decoupling in ex-ante
sense – flat regionalised payments in the
EU-15 and SAP without coupled top-ups in
the NMS. 
The strategic decisions to exit from or stay in
agriculture and to increase farm area have been
analysed for individual countries. Data on farmers’
values and objectives across all five countries have
been studied through cluster analysis in order to
identify groups of farmers with similarly held be-
liefs and objectives and understand their charac-
teristics. The main policy relevant conclusions are
first summarised country by country and then on a
cross-country basis. 
According to farmers’ intentions, the introduc-
tion of decoupled payments will have little direct
effect on structural change in England. Few farmers
plan to modify their exit or growth decisions under
SFP arrangements compared to what they would
have done if they faced a continuation of the
Agenda 2000 policy environment. The more pro-
nounced adjustment concerns production choices
(even though the majority of the respondents are not
planning to change their output mix, some intend to
decrease their cattle production) and to a certain ex-
tent diversification to off-farm activities. Therefore,
this early empirical research suggests that in Eng-
land the adjustments to the 2003 CAP reform are
likely to be subtle and to concern mainly produc-
tion activity choices and diversification.
A direct comparison between England and
France would be illuminating due to the differ-
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ences in the implementation of decoupling and
different regulations concerning trade of entitle-
ments in the two states. Unfortunately, due to the
difficulties with data collection in France, direct
comparisons are difficult to draw. The French sam-
ple is restricted in its geographical coverage and
mountainous regions were not covered. Addition-
ally, the regions surveyed are relatively homoge-
nous and the farmers interviewed in general rely
only partially on their on-farm income and are
younger than the national average. Nevertheless,
the French results are similar to the findings from
England in that few farmers intend to alter their
plans to exit or grow as a result of the introduction
of the SFP. Intentions are little affected by the
switch to SFP in France, which may be expected
given the conservative manner in which France has
chosen to implement the SFP. 
In contrast to England and France, in Sweden
the implementation of SFP is more likely to stimu-
late the structural change as some farmers are
planning to exit earlier than they would have done
under Agenda 2000. Very little land is however
likely to be abandoned as the demand for land for
farm growth persists after the change in policy. 
Summarising the results for the three studied
EU-15 Member States, it appears that farmers plan
to apply a minimal adjustment strategy in response
to changes in agricultural policy, at least in France
and England. There is no strong evidence that
farmers intend to drastically change their strategic
decisions to exit agriculture. Few farmers are in-
terested in merely keeping land in good agricul-
tural and environmental condition (GAEC) and not
producing. 
In the NMS (Lithuania and Slovakia), the im-
plementation of the 2003 CAP reform has a differ-
ent meaning. The implementation of the SAP in the
NMS means a significant increase in the degree of
protection afforded to farmers in the form of both
higher and more predictable payments. Therefore,
it is not surprising that in Lithuania the main im-
pact of the payments is evidenced in a greater will-
ingness to operate larger farms. As the returns to
agricultural activities are expected to rise, farmers
are less interested in diversification and have no
wish to leave land uncultivated under GAEC. This
comparable pattern is repeated in Slovakia: the
switch from pre-accession policy to the SAPS in-
duces a significant rise in the numbers who wish to
stay in agriculture. However, in Lithuania and Slo-
vakia, the characteristics of those seeking to stay
or expand do vary. In Slovakia, likelihood of ex-
pansion of farm area is related to managerial expe-
rience and farm location. In Lithuania expansion
plans are linked to lifecycle variables (age and suc-
cession status).
In analysing the differences between the EU-
15 and NMS, it should be noted, however, that
what has been studied in the NMS is not so much
the effect of a switch from coupled to decoupled
payments but the effect of the introduction of the
CAP payments as a result of EU accession. From
this point of view, the differences in responses be-
tween the EU-15 and NMS are justified as the
farmers respond to different policy changes.
The comparative cross-country analysis gen-
erates several important insights for policy, stem-
ming from the analysis of farmers’ attitudes across
the pooled sample of five states. First, most farm-
ers still possess a productionist mindset and do not
accept the idea that they could survive or be com-
petitive without policy support. The sampled farm-
ers strongly disagree with statements advocating
the removal of policy support and, at the same
time, express preferences for the full utilisation of
agricultural land for agricultural production and
concentration on farming. More than one-third of
the respondents strongly disagree with the notion
that good farming skills are sufficient to run a prof-
itable business whatever the design of European
policies. At the same time, a half of the respon-
dents think that the CAP system of support imposes
restrictions on their future farming plans. So, it ap-
pears that farmers rely on policy support although
a large proportion of them realise that this support
might be conditional on some restrictions on their
farming activities. The only farmers who endorse
policy liberalisation are those who are largely
based in sectors that traditionally receive little CAP
support (pigs and poultry).
Second, the often advocated strategy of diver-
sification and development of multiple income
sources still creates difficulties for a substantial
proportion of European farmers. This is due to a
mixture of beliefs that farmers should focus on the
production of food and fibre and a lack of appro-
priate skills and off-farm opportunities. More than
40 % of the respondents do not think they can eas-
ily find a job off-farm or increase the number of
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hours devoted to off-farm work. This emphasises
once again the limitations of rural development
policies that are focused solely on the farming
community. Farmers are unlikely to create a signif-
icant number of new jobs through the pursuit of
enterprise diversification, which is an infeasible
option for many and their own future prosperity
depends on the availability of work in the non-
farm rural economy. Pessimism surrounding the
opportunities for diversification is not confined to
the relatively poorer NMS. In fact, upland grass-
land farmers in England are the most pessimistic
about their ability to adapt.
Third, although the overwhelming majority
advocate protection, farmers are more flexible in
terms of the instruments through which policy sup-
port might be delivered. One of the positive mes-
sages emerging from this research is that the
majority of respondents agree with the need for
farmers to produce attractive landscapes and pos-
itive environmental externalities and be paid for
this. The non-pecuniary benefits of farming also
feature prominently. The latter are crucial for un-
derstanding why farmers’ responses to policy re-
forms have been rather modest or at least more
modest than expected.
Finally, the strongest opposition to policy lib-
eralisation comes from farmers in the NMS. New-
comers to farming in the NMS strongly reject
policy liberalisation and endorse notions that farm-
ers should concentrate on agriculture which cor-
roborates with the previously mentioned intentions
to stay longer in agriculture or grow more. For
them diversification seems to be associated with
liberalisation tendencies. These views are likely to
have important implications for the decision-mak-
ing processes surrounding agricultural policy re-
form in the EU. The new entrants to the Union are
expected to strengthen the political opposition to
agricultural policy reform and undermine attempts
to extend the reform measures, including the cap-
ping and further modulation of the Single Farm
Payment.
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Effect of CAP and Market Scenarios on Farm Income and Invest-
ment Behaviour - Case Studies from Selected EU Countries
SERGIO GOMEZ Y PALOMA* AND DAVIDE VIAGGI†
Introduction
This paper reports some preliminary results of
the study “Investment behaviour in conventional
and emerging farming systems under different pol-
icy scenarios” coordinated by the IPTS, Seville.‡
The objectives of the study were:
• to perform an ex-ante analysis of investment
behaviour among farming systems clustered
by the use of conventional and emerging
production practices;
• to assess the impact of the 2003 CAP reform
- with special focus on the Single Farm Pay-
ment (SFP) - on producers’ investment be-
haviour using scenario analysis (8-12 years
horizon);
• to evaluate the consequences of investment
behaviour with respect to the sustainability
of farming systems and to make appropriate
policy recommendations.
Background and literature
The review of the literature on farm invest-
ment behaviour focuses on: a) the determinants
of investment behaviour; b) the effects of policy on
investment behaviour; c) the classification of quan-
titative tools for analysing farm investment behav-
iour; and d) the choice of methodology for the
empirical analysis of farm investment behaviour.
Contributions on this issue have been rela-
tively less numerous than for other fields of agri-
cultural economics research, despite its evident
importance for the representation of farm behav-
iour. The analysis of investment at firm level be-
came an important issue in the general economic
literature during the 1950s and 1960s and bur-
geoned in the agricultural economic literature dur-
ing the 1990s. Early approaches, based on the
neoclassical theory of the firm, were subsequently
discussed and improved.
During the last two decades the literature fo-
cused on a number of investment-related topics
such as asset fixity and adjustment costs, uncer-
tainty and information, risk and other objectives,
household characteristics, on-farm vs. off-farm in-
vestment, investment and labour allocation, invest-
ment and farm structure, investment and technical
change, investment and contracts and investment
and credit constraints.
Despite the variety of themes and approaches,
the present understanding of farm investment be-
haviour is considered to be, to a large extent, un-
satisfactory. The main research gaps include the
need for: a) more adequate instruments for ex-ante
analysis; b) model adaptation to incorporate em-
pirical information about farm preferences and ex-
pectations; c) closer attention to the connection
between investment, technical change and learn-
ing; and d) a more empirically relevant treatment
of the decision maker’s (farm household’s, firm’s)
objectives.
The amount of literature and the state of the
art appear particularly unsatisfactory as far as pol-
icy analysis is concerned and particularly for ex-
ante policy evaluation. Although a few recent
studies tackled this issue, focusing to a large ex-
tent on decoupling, the analysis of policy impact
on investment behaviour still appears to be a par-
ticularly challenging task. This may be attributed
to the fact that policy scenarios interact with all
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* European Commission, Directorate-General Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (EC-JRC IPTS), Edificio Expo, c/Inca Garci-
laso, s/n, E-41092 Sevilla, Seville, Spain. E-mail: sergio.gomez-y-paloma@ec.europa.eu.
† University of Bologna, Department of Agricultural Economics and Engineering, Via Filippo Re, 10 - 40126 Bologna, Italy. E-mail: davide.vi-
aggi@unibo.it.
‡ The study was carried out by a network of researchers coordinated by Vittorio Gallerani and Davide Viaggi (Bologna University) and, from
the JRC IPTS side, by Sergio Gomez y Paloma.
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other (numerous) determinants, particularly whole
household/firm management, risk perception,
asset liquidity and output prices.
Methodology
The methodology adopted in this study is
based on the integration of empirical primary in-
formation collected through a survey of about 250
farm households with a modelling exercise of the
individual farms surveyed. Case studies were de-
veloped for Italy, Germany, Poland, Spain, Greece,
The Netherlands, France and Hungary.
The first part of the methodology is based on
the analysis of data collected through the survey
and about the reaction of farmers to decoupling.
The second part is based on the simulation of
scenarios using multi-criteria dynamic program-
ming models of farm households, built for 80 indi-
vidual farms selected from the sample of 250. The
model is calibrated on primary data from the sur-
vey of single farms through a questionnaire.
Selected scenarios implemented in the model
are:
1) Baseline 1: Agenda 2000 + current prices
2.1) Decoupling 1: 2003 reform + current
prices
2.2) Decoupling 2: 2003 reform + lower
prices (WTO scenario) (-20 %)
3.1) Payment cut 1: 2003 reform (up to 2013)
+ no payment after 2013 + current prices
3.2) Payment cut 2: 2003 reform (up to 2013)
+ gradual reduction of payments after
2013 + current prices
3.3) Payment cut 3: 2003 reform (up to 2013)
+ gradual reduction of payments after
2013 + lower prices (-20 %)
Main results
Most farmers use the CAP support to cover
farm current expenditure. Main uses of CAP rev-
enues are:
• On farm current expenditure = 66 %
• On farm investment = 19 %
• Off farm productive investment = 9 %
• Off farm consumption = 6 %
In the majority of cases, farmers stated they
were indifferent to decoupling (55 %). Among the
others, the impact of decoupling was highly differ-
entiated; major reactions stated are:
• Increase on farm investment = 24 %
• Decrease on farm investment = 7 %
• Change in crop mix = 7 %
• Increase off farm investment = 4 %
• Decrease off farm investment = 3 %
Differences in reaction are better explained
by different individual household/farm characteris-
tics rather than by association with a specific agri-
cultural system. In the more efficient and
expansion-oriented farms, decoupling is perceived
as an opportunity for investment, while in small,
poorer performing farms the introduction of the
SFP is viewed rather as an opportunity for extensi-
fication.
Scenario analysis showed that CAP as a whole
is very important for the sustainability of farming
systems. However, prices (in the range simulated)
appeared to be more important than policy and
adaptation of farm activities more important than
investment as a reaction to both policy and prices.
Average farm income variation of each sce-
nario - compared to Agenda 2000 (A2000) - are
reported in Table 1, while Table 2 reports the ef-
fects on investments.
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Table 1: Average farm income variation
Scenario 2006-2013 2014-2021
2.1 – 2003 Reform 2 % (2 %) 4 % (4 %)
2.2 – 2003 Reform + Low Prices (LP) -32 % (-23 %) -33 % (-23 %)
3.1 – 2003 Reform + Payments (Pym.) Cut 2013 0 % (2 %) -18 % (-14 %)
3.2 – 2003 Reform + Gradual Pym. Reduction (GPymR) 2013 1 % (2 %) -11 % (-8 %)
3.3 – 2003 Reform + GPymR2013+ LP -32 % (-22 %) -43 % (-31 %)
Note: Numbers in the table indicate a percentage share of A2000; numbers in brackets indicate household income.
Table 2: Average investment variation
Scenario 2006-2013 2014-2021
2.1 – 2003 Reform -60 % -11 %
2.2 – 2003 Reform + LP -38 % -36 %
3.1 – 2003 Reform + Pym. cut 2013 -216 % -34 %
3.2 – 2003 Reform + GPymR2013 -76 % -77 %
3.3 – 2003 Reform + GPymR2013+ LP -153 % -50 %
Note: Numbers in the table indicate a percentage share of A2000.
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Decoupling in itself does not cause major
changes in income, while important impacts may
be expected by the scenarios of price and payment
reduction. The impact on investments is consis-
tently negative across scenarios. However, the av-
erage presented is characterised by a strong
variability within each scenario and each case
study area. This reinforces the hypothesis of a
strong effect of individual (structural and personal
characteristics) in determining the results of the re-
action to policy and market scenarios.
Discussion
From the perspective of the farms-households
interviewed, post-decoupling CAP appeared to be
very much a ‘policy in search of objectives’ that
takes on very different roles depending on the con-
text in which it is cast.
However, results hint at the fact that a number
of wider issues should be addressed in order to un-
derstand farm household behaviour with respect
to policies. In particular, demographic trends, job
and land use opportunities and technological op-
tions seem to be major drivers of a farm house-
hold’s reaction to CAP.
The results confirm the need for better empiri-
cal information in this field, contextualized within
the present stage of EU agriculture and policy. They
also highlight the importance of combining infor-
mation about intentional behaviour and expecta-
tions with modelling outcomes. Future studies will
be needed, focusing on ex-ante policy analysis and
design, taking into account emerging technologies
and market scenarios, as well as future farming/rural
agents (households, firms with legal attributes and
their networks) as the most appropriate decision-
making units. The interplay between individual at-
titudes, technology adoption, investment and
structural change could be a priority field of re-
search, particularly in view of reinforcing competi-
tiveness strategies of EU agriculture. 
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Role of Ownership in Investment Behaviour of Corporate
Farms — Evidence from Czech Agriculture
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JARMILA CURTISS*, TOMÁŠ RATINGER* AND TOMÁŠ MEDONOS†
Introduction
Investment is a business activity that is neces-
sary for securing adoption of new technologies,
achieving economies of scale and scope, or facil-
itating other competitive strategies. It is therefore
one of the most important preconditions for the
economic viability of a business. This paper starts
with a general discussion analysing farm invest-
ment activity particularly in new Member States
(NMS) of the European Union (EU), investment di-
vergences related to farm structures and possible
investment impacts of agricultural policies. The
second part of the paper illustrates the role of the
internal characteristics of farms in shaping their in-
vestment behaviour using an empirical study of the
relationship between corporate ownership and in-
vestment activity in the Czech Republic.
Investment, policy and farm struc-
ture — general discussion
Importance of agricultural investment in
new Member States
Within the agricultural sectors of the EU, in-
vestment activity plays a particularly vital role for
farms in the NMS. Studies analysing the agricultural
sectors in these countries at the beginning of transi-
tion identified them as undercapitalised (e.g. Janda,
Sklenková and Vigner, 1997), pointing to a major
need for farm investment. A farm survey carried out
in the Czech Republic in 20041 showed that farms
were able to improve their investment activity only
slowly. Individual farmers as well as managers of
corporate farms mostly rated farm investment activ-
ity over the transition period until 2003 as unsatis-
factory. This was particularly the case of corporate
farms — 25% of respondents rated their investment
activity as lower than necessary for simple asset re-
placement and 39% as just covering the level of
simple asset replacement. These shares are lower
for individual farms — 20% and 27% respectively.
Nevertheless, the investment activity of both groups
of farms increased over the period analysed. This in-
crease was accompanied by changes in investment
structure, especially in individual farms, and varied
according to the production specialisations of
farms. In 2003, a significant share of farms2 still re-
garded the technical standard of their buildings, ma-
chinery and equipment as requiring substantial
investments. As a related fact, more than 50% of
farm operations/plants in that year did not satisfy EU
standard requirements. The Czech example demon-
strates the investment insufficiencies with which
the NMS entered the competitive EU agricultural
market.
External determinants of investment activ-
ity — role for policy
Farm investment development at the begin-
ning of transition was hindered by limited access
* European Commission, Directorate-General Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (EC-JRC IPTS), Edificio Expo, C/. Inca Gar-
cilaso, s/n, E-41092 Sevilla, Seville, Spain. E-mails: jarmila.curtiss@ec.europa.eu and tomas.ratinger@ec.europa.eu. The authors are solely
responsible for the information provided in the paper; it does not represent the opinion of the European Community.
† Research Institute of Agricultural Economics (VÚZE), Mánesova 75, 120 58 Prague 2, Czech Republic. E-mail: medonos@vuze.cz.
1 This survey was carried out jointly by the Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), Halle
(Saale) and the Research Institute of Agricultural Economics in Prague (VÚZE). It was financed by IAMO, the Marie Curie Fellowship
(HPMD-CT-2001-00063) hosted by IAMO, and the Czech National Agency for Science and Research (QF3269). The sample consisted of
167 corporate farms and 110 individual farms. The sample is random but not statistically representative. Individual private farms are rep-
resented by on average larger farms than given by the national average. The production structure of both types of farms does not on av-
erage closely copy the national production structure. For the full survey documentation and results presentation, see Curtissová et al.
(2005). 
2 This share varies among farm types and production specialisation and equals 61% of corporate farms in livestock production and 42%
of corporate farms in crop production, and 30% of individual farms in livestock production and 45% of individual farms in crop produc-
tion.
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to modern technologies (Lotze, 1998), political
and economic uncertainties and institutional in-
completeness. Generally, one of the most impor-
tant external determinants of optimal firm/farm
investment was the functioning of capital and
credit markets and related institutions (Mueller and
Peev, 2007). As agriculture makes limited use of
capital market instruments, the capital market
plays a relatively minor role in the investment and
technological development of the agricultural sec-
tor. However, the credit market could be assumed
to play a more important role. A study by Bezemer
(2003) indicated that credit constraints represented
significant investment constraints in the Czech Re-
public, discriminating against certain groups of
farms, specifically individual private farms. More
recent empirical studies suggest that credit institu-
tions in the Czech Republic, even if still restricting
the amounts loaned, allocate credit on the basis of
standardised criteria for economic valuation of
borrowers (see e.g. Medonos, 2007; Latruffe, Davi-
dova and Ratinger, 2005; Latruffe and Davidova,
2007) and thus no longer represent highly relevant
financial constraints. It is predominantly the in-
come level and firm value that determine the ac-
cess to credit and the overall investment
possibilities of the firm. Farm income support can
therefore represent a means by which policy trans-
fers can significantly alter farms’ financial possibil-
ities and investment activity3.
Investment as the accelerating factor of
the effect of uneven direct aid distribution
on farm structural changes
The overall positive effect of policy support on
investment in a low income sector such as agricul-
ture can become disturbing in the case of uneven
distribution across regions and farms by having an
incongruous impact on structural changes. The un-
even distribution of direct aid based on the EU’s
common agricultural policy (CAP) has indeed at-
tracted some criticism (see e.g. Sapir et al., 2003).
The structural effect of uneven aid distribution can
be an issue especially since the share of direct pay-
ments in net farm income (NFI)4 is substantial. In
the Czech Republic, this share was 65.3%
in 20055. Also there, uneven distribution of direct
support has been reported: 71% of the total num-
ber of farms, small and predominantly individual
farms, received less than 5% of the direct pay-
ments allocated to the sector (State Agricultural
and Intervention Fund 2007). However, this has
not been related to information such as how many
shareholders have assets in, how much labour is
employed in, and how many land owners rent
their land to the large-scale farms which received
the remaining 95% of direct payments. The notion
of uneven distribution stems only from the fact that
individual farms, which represent 87% of all farms,
cultivate 28% of the agricultural land but receive
less than 22% of direct payments allocated to the
sector in 2005. A relevant fact is that the bulk of di-
rect payments is allocated to large-scale farms
which are characterised by either (a) a highly dis-
persed ownership structure, in which owners have
limited but more or less equal rights over the use
of the direct payments, or (b) marked tendencies
to ownership concentration (see Curtiss
et al., 2006), under which direct payments benefit
only a narrower group of owners. As corporate
governance literature suggests, both ownership
configurations could significantly differ in their in-
vestment behaviour and thus in the use of the di-
rect support for investment purposes.
Farm ownership and investment —
empirical study of Czech corporate
farms
The aim of the empirical study which will be
briefly presented below was to shed light on the
behavioural pattern related to the investment and
ownership relationship in Czech corporate farms.
Two data sources were combined for this analysis:
an unbalanced seven-year panel from FADN and
survey data for 74 farms. For the full paper, see
Curtiss et al. (2007).Te
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3 Considering the differences between the effects of coupled or decoupled income support, see the paper by Odening and Hüttel in this
publication. In general they argue that payment decoupling decreases incentives to invest in previously supported productions and in-
creases incentives to reallocate funds to a new allocatively more efficient production structure. This is, however, burdened by asset speci-
ficity and high sunk costs. Nevertheless, decoupled payments still represent additional income which can improve the farms’ bank
valuation and generate internal funds for smaller investments.
4 NFI is taken from the Economic Accounts for Agriculture and calculated according to the Eurostat methodology.
5 The share of all support for farms in NFI was 76.1%.
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Theoretical background
The relationship between the ownership struc-
ture and investment activity of the farm is well cap-
tured by the corporate governance literature.
Related issues such as firm ownership and perform-
ance relationship are the subject of agency, prop-
erty rights or transaction cost theories. Corporate
governance represents the rules for the exercise of
ownership rights and decision-making or, in other
words, contracts, organisational designs and legisla-
tion securing/motivating efficient management.
These rules/contracts are important for dealing with
the problems of ownership and management sepa-
ration and thus the level of agency cost. The corpo-
rate governance design determines the scope for
managerial discretion as managers have greater ex-
pertise and more information relating to the firm’s
performance than owners. The owners, particularly
when shares are only limitedly tradable, are inter-
ested in maximising profit that generates dividends,
while managers prefer strategies of growth and tend
towards overinvestment. This tendency can be re-
duced, if managers buy out significant shares lead-
ing to managerial ownership. There can also be
another group of owners, namely employees who
got their shares from restitution or invested in farm’s
shares. Their business interests are connected with
job security. They are therefore more risk averse and
prefer lower investments. 
Ownership configurations capturing different
degrees of external ownership, employee owner-
ship and managerial ownership as well as
the overall effect of corporate governance of joint
stock companies and cooperatives (compared to
the simpler organisational form of limited liability
companies) provide the main focus of the empiri-
cal analysis presented below.
Specifics of corporate ownership in transi-
tion countries
For interpreting the results, a number of corpo-
rate ownership characteristics specific to transition
countries had to be taken into account, namely: 
• The different evolution of corporate owner-
ship compared to mature market economies.
Farms in transition have not developed from
small to large, but were large and have re-
mained large after privatisation. It has been
mostly the interest of the managers to follow
the large-scale strategy, and many of the
restitution claimants/owners had no alterna-
tive options. 
• The ownership is highly dispersed and the
shareholders have only limited experience
in management monitoring. This character-
istic provides greater scope for managerial
discretion. 
• The interests of restituted external owners
(shareholders) are often different from busi-
ness interests. The external owners are fre-
quently pensioners and urban residents
waiting for settlement of their restitution ti-
tles to cash them afterwards.
• Many Czech farms developed into the legal
form of a joint stock company; however, the
stocks are not openly tradable.
• There is a low level of legal protection of
shareholders’ interests provided by under-
developed institutions for corporate gover-
nance and a high level of legal uncertainty
concerning the property rights (see Mueller
and Peev, 2007).
Modelling framework
As the theoretical discussion indicated, there
are possible reasons for the ownership structure
having an impact on investment activity. To con-
struct an econometric model, other determinants
of investment activity also have to be incorporated.
We considered investment opportunities, past
technical and financial performance of the farm
and human capital characteristics. The resulting
modelling framework is summarised in Figure 2. 
The three arrows leading from the ownership
structure indicate the above discussed effects of
ownership on investment activity and the owner-
ship effect on technical and financial performance.
Technical performance can be replaced by TE and
financial performance by returns to capital (CF/K).
Under this definition, technical performance influ-
ences financial performance. Returns to capital
represent internal funds, which especially under fi-
nancial constraints represent an important deter-
minant of investment activity. Also the question to
what extent internal funds should be used can be
dealt with differently under different ownership
configurations (effect of ownership on the invest-
ment sensitivity to internal funds). 
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Figure 2: Conceptual framework for modelling the ownership-investment relationship
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This framework is reflected in the economet-
ric model, which consists of a three-equation sys-
tem. The first equation represents the investment
accelerator model with financial constraint, de-
fined as a function of investment potential and in-
ternal funds (return to capital), to which we added
ownership variables. The second equation defines
the returns to capital as a function of ownership
structure and technical efficiency; the third equa-
tion specifies technical efficiency as dependent on
ownership variables and human capital variables.
Empirical results
The estimated results confirmed the main
logic of the conceptual model. Increasing techni-
cal efficiency increases the level of internal funds,
and internal funds together with investment oppor-
tunities positively influence investment activity.
The significant positive relationship between inter-
nal funds and investment activity indicates that fi-
nancial constraints still exist. 
Corporate governance6 was found to nega-
tively influence farm technical performance as it
is related to higher complexity of the organisa-
tional structure, labour supervision and monitor-
ing, as well as to lower managerial incentives
linked to the managers-owners separation. Further-
more, increasing the number of owners worsens
the financial performance of the corporate farm.
The effect of corporate ownership on investment
activity was expected to be positive as managers
theoretically tend towards over-investment. The es-
timates revealed that this is not the case in Czech
corporate farms. If we assume that the group of
large-scale farms not affected by corporate gover-
nance (mostly limited liability companies) is in-
vesting closer to the optimum, the corporate farms
as defined in the study actually under-invest.
This result does not change with the number of
owners, and implies either (a) that corporate own-
ership in transition discourages or even limits man-
agement in realising investment projects as the
shareholders are risk- and investment-averse, or (b)
that management lacks investment incentives be-
cause of uncertainty related to the future with-
drawal of shares/assets of those whose property
rights are currently violated/unsettled. The man-
agement reserved investment approach is found to
be significantly stronger if managers own higher
than average capital shares, an outcome that sup-
ports the argument of uncertainties related to prop-
erty rights settlement. 
Another ownership variable represented the
average size of share per owner, a proxy for own-
ership concentration. It was hypothesised that a
larger average share reflects the owners’ greater
willingness to invest in the agricultural business,
therefore the owners’ lower risk aversion and
higher interest in the efficient running of the com-
pany. Hence, it should improve technical effi-
ciency, financial performance and the efficiency of
Investment activity
Investment sensitivity 
to internal funds
Past technical efficiency
(technical performance) 
Ownership structure
Past return to capital/investment
(financial performance)     
==>  internal funds 
Under financial constraints
6 The corporate governance variable was defined as a dummy variable: 1 represented firms with more than 20 owners and 0 firms with 10
and less owners, mostly limited liability companies. There were no farms in the sample with an intermediate number of owners.
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controlling managers’ investment activities. These
effects were empirically confirmed at the 1% sig-
nificance level. The sign of the effect of the average
share size on investment activity shows that in-
creasing ownership share size7 improves problems
with under-investment related to corporate own-
ership. This result therefore indicates larger own-
ers’ lower risk aversion and their higher interest in
the farm’s long-run performance. The results also
revealed that companies with larger shareholders
are more open to credit financing than small share-
holders.
Conclusions
Based on the empirical results we can con-
clude that the structure of corporate ownership has
a significant negative impact on farm economic
performance as well as investment activity. The in-
vestment activity of corporate farms is still signifi-
cantly affected by the failures of the privatisation
process, which retained as persons eligible for
property shares shareholders with low interest in
farming business and high risk aversion to invest-
ment and credit financing in the sector. Corporate
farms with higher average ownership shares per-
form significantly better and show significantly
higher investment activity, while farms with high
ownership dispersion invest less and depend in
this activity significantly more on internal funds in-
cluding agricultural subsidies. The high level of
policy transfers could, therefore, help the latter
farms to remain in the agricultural business with-
out speedy ownership changes. Nevertheless,
ownership concentration can be expected to rep-
resent the long-run trend in structural changes in
Czech agriculture.
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In
co
m
e 
an
d 
Fa
ct
or
 M
ar
ke
ts
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
20
03
 C
A
P 
R
ef
or
m
 –
 W
or
ks
ho
p 
Pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s
58
Czech Republic. 94th EAAE Seminar, ‘From
Households to Firms with Independent Legal Sta-
tus: The Spectrum of Institutional Units in the
Development of European Agriculture’. Imperial
College London, Wye Campus, United King-
dom. 9-10 April.
Lotze, H., 1998. Integration and Transition on Eu-
ropean Agricultural and Food Markets: Policy Re-
form, European Union Enlargement, and Foreign
Direct Investment - Four Essays in Applied Par-
tial and General Equilibrium Modelling, Disserta-
tion. 
http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/agrar/lotze-
hermann/HTML/lotze.html.
Sapir, A., Aghion, P., Bertola, G., Hellwig, M., Pi-
sani-Ferry, J., Rosati, D., Vinals, J., Wallace, H.,
2003. An Agenda for a Growing Europe: Mak-
ing the EU Economic System Deliver. Report to
the EC, Brussels.
State Agricultural and Intervention Fund, 2007.
Seznam p íjemc  hlavních dotací z fond  EU
a ze státního rozpo tu R prost ednictvím ad-
ministrace SZIF (List of beneficiaries of main CAP
payments and payments from state budget of
Czech Republic administrated by SAIF). Data-
base for year 2005. 
http://www.szif.cz/irj/portal/anonymous/po-
datelna~spd.
Te
ch
ni
ca
l R
ep
or
t S
er
ie
s


European Commission
EUR 23422 EN  – Joint Research Centre – Institute for Prospective Technological Studies
Title: Income and Factor Markets under the 2003 CAP Reform. Workshop Proceedings 
Editors: Adriana CRISTOIU, Jarmila CURTISS
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
2008
EUR – Scientific and Technical Research series – ISSN 1018-5593
Abstract
The European Council in December 2005 invited the European Commission (EC) to report in
2008-2009 on the European Union budgetary spending including that on the common agricultural
policy (CAP). In relation to this call, EC initiated a "health check" of the 2003 CAP reform aiming at the
assessment of its impacts. This political interest and ongoing political debates stress on the high topi-
cal relevance of the farm- and regional-level as well as market effects of the CAP. 
A workshop that reunited researchers and policymakers was organised in June 2007 in Seville
with the aim to examine and to discuss recent research results and available empirical evidence related
to the potential effects of implementing the 2003 CAP reform on the agricultural income and factor mar-
kets in the EU Member States. 
This report reunites several papers provided as additional support to the presentations given dur-
ing the workshop. The topics of the papers in this report relate to the effects of the Pillar 1 instruments
on the income distribution among regions and/or farming systems, and the effects of decoupling direct
payments on agricultural factor markets. Potential changes of farmers' behaviour under the new pol-
icy context are also considered.
How to obtain EU publications
Our priced publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.eu-
ropa.eu), where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice.
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. You can obtain
their contact details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758.
IN
ST
IT
U
TE
 F
O
R
 P
R
O
SP
EC
TI
V
E 
TE
C
H
N
O
LO
G
IC
A
L 
ST
U
D
IE
S
EN
        LF-N
A
-23422-EN
-C
 
EU
R
 2
34
22
 E
N
Income and Factor Markets
under the 2003 CAP Reform
– Workshop Proceedings
Publications Office
Publications.ec.europa.eu
The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific
and technical support for the conception, development, implementa-
tion and monitoring of EU policies. As a service of the European Com-
mission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of science and
technology for the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves
the common interest of the Member States, while being independent of
special interests, whether private or national.
